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Firm Dynamics and Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: Does Trade 
Openness Matter? Evidence from Mexico's Manufacturing Sector
* 
 
In this paper we study the effect of NAFTA on the responsiveness of Mexican economy to 
real exchange rate shocks. We argue that, by opening the U.S. and Canadian markets to 
Mexican goods, NAFTA made it easier for domestic producers to take advantage of the 
opportunities brought by the depreciation of the real exchange rate. To identify this 
mechanism, we use plant-level data and compare the behavior of employment, production 
and investment after two big real exchange rate shocks: the first observed in the mid 1980s, 
the second the Tequila Crisis of 1994-5. The evidence indicates that after passage of NAFTA 
exporting firms exhibited higher growth rates of employment, sales, and investment vis-á-vis 
non-exporters. We confirm our results by analyzing the behavior of a control group of firms, 
that had complete access to the U.S. market during both devaluations, and we show that 
they responded in a similar way in both events. Finally, we also provide direct evidence on 
the relationship between exports and tariff reductions brought by NAFTA. Our results support 
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Over the last two decades many developing countries have undergone economic reforms, in-
cluding trade liberalizations that have lowered tari® and non-tari® barriers. At the same
time, these countries have continued to experience signi¯cant macroeconomic shocks, includ-
ing exchange rate crises, sudden stops in capital in°ows and foreign debt defaults. Although
both phenomena have been widely studied in the profession, the interaction between them
has remained an under researched topic. It is precisely this gap what we will study in this pa-
per: the interaction of economic reforms (particularly trade liberalization) and the reaction
of open economies to aggregate shocks.
In particular, we focus on the extent to which trade reform a®ects the way in which
the economy responds to changes in the real exchange rate. We do this in the speci¯c
context of the Mexican manufacturing sector, using ¯rm-level longitudinal data to compare
the reactions of employment, output, exports and investment to (big) changes in the real
exchange rate in the absence and presence of NAFTA.
Our research design is motivated by the path of Mexico's real exchange rate, presented
in Figure 1. As can be seen, there were two very large depreciations of the real exchange
rate: one in the mid 1980s, the other the well-known "Tequila Crisis" of the 1994-1995. Both
episodes witnessed enormous declines in the relative prices of domestic (Mexican) goods: the
real exchange rate depreciation exceeded 70% in both episodes.1 Yet, the two crises occurred
in di®erent economic environments, with NAFTA being perhaps the most important change
of all. We seek to study precisely how these changes a®ected the dynamics of adjustment to
real exchange rate shocks in the manufacturing sector.
Our paper is also related to the large and growing literature that attempts to evaluate
the e®ects of NAFTA on the Mexican economy. This literature has analyzed among other
issues the impact of NAFTA on wage inequality, aggregate growth and productivity.2 We
contribute to the literature by focusing on how NAFTA altered the responsiveness of the
economy to real exchange rate shocks. The causal link underlying our analysis is straight-
forward: NAFTA increased the size of the external market for Mexican products. Hence,
following a signi¯cant depreciation of the real exchange rate, the increase in external demand
for Mexican output would be larger in the post-NAFTA era, and possibly large enough to
o®set the decline in domestic demand caused by the crisis.
1We will adopt the convention of referring to Mexico as the domestic economy.
2Each of these topics is analyzed in Esquivel and Rodr¶ ³guez-L¶ opez (2003) and Verhoogen (2003) (wage
inequality), Easterly, Fiess, and Lederman (2003) (growth and convergence), L¶ opez-C¶ ordova (2003) (man-
ufacturing productivity), Romalis (2004) and Krueger (2000) on trade creation and diversion, and Kose,
Meredith, and Towe (2004) on the synchronization of business cycles.
2The next section of the paper explains in detail the mechanism through which an in-
crease in the economy's degree of openness can change its response to real exchange rate
changes. In Section 3, we present the empirical evidence regarding the response of manufac-
turing ¯rms to real exchange rate shocks before and after NAFTA was in place. Our results
indicate that after NAFTA, manufacturing ¯rms increased their output, investment and em-
ployment more rapidly in response to real exchange rate depreciations. Section 4 presents
some robustness checks that provide strong support for the hypothesis that the lower U.S.
tari®s charged to Mexican goods after NAFTA are the key explanation for the di®erent
behavior observed in the earlier and later crises. To strengthen our argument further, in
Section 5 we present an overview of the main developments in the Mexican economy since
the 1980s. We will argue that NAFTA is the main structural reform introduced in Mexico
between the two peaks of the real exchange rate and that it is the main suspect to which
the di®erent behavior in the manufacturing sector can be attributed. Section 6 concludes.
2 How Did NAFTA A®ect Mexico? Microeconomic
and Macroeconomic E®ects.
Previous research on the impact of NAFTA has focused on the traditional questions brought
by trade liberalization, including (i) trade creation and trade diversion brought by the trade
agreement, (ii) factor returns and income distribution, (iii) productivity changes, (iv) con-
vergence of income levels among participants of the agreement and (v) synchronization of
business cycles among the participants in the trade agreement. Here we will seek to analyze
another potential e®ect of trade liberalization: an increase in the responsiveness of output
to external shocks.
The mechanism through which this e®ect arises is an increase in size of the external
market. In e®ect, Free Trade Agreements are a particular type of trade reform distinguished
by reciprocal access to each country's markets.3 From this point of view NAFTA implied
a signi¯cant increase in the potential demand for Mexican output. We argue that the ex-
panded external market constitutes a mechanism that allows producers to weather the de-
clines in domestic demands that occur during macroeconomic crises. Ultimately, this allows
a macroeconomic adjustment that is less costly in terms of lost output and employment.
The traditional policy prescription for a small open economy that needs to decrease
its external de¯cit calls for a reduction of aggregate domestic expenditure (through tighter
3Of course complete access is not granted for all goods immediately and some sectors are never opened
to free trade. This was not the case of the manufacturing sector.
3monetary and/or ¯scal policies) and a real depreciation of the currency.4 The objective of
the real exchange rate depreciation is to shift production inputs (most importantly labor) to
the tradable goods sector. Since aggregate domestic expenditure is declining by assumption,
the additional production of the tradable goods sector is shipped abroad. Implicit in this
analysis is the assumption that the country faces a perfectly elastic demand for its exports
that will absorb all the additional production of the country. In reality this assumption might
not hold and therefore di®erent degrees of access to foreign markets will imply di®erent paths
of adjustment.
The speci¯c path of adjustment the country follows can have important welfare con-
sequences. Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) highlight this point from a slightly di®erent
angle. In their post-mortem analysis of Argentina's collapse in 2001, Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Talvi (2003) stress that the limited external openness of Argentina's economy required an
extremely big real depreciation to cope with the sudden stop in capital in°ows experienced
by that country in 1999. The massive depreciation combined with widespread liability cre-
ated by dollarization produced a negative balance-sheet e®ect that contributed to the depth
of the recession. According to Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2003) the depreciation of the
real exchange rate was smaller in countries where the output of tradable goods was more
sensitive to changes in that relative price. From this perspective, our paper will contribute
to understand the microeconomic channel through which all these occur.
In order to estimate the impact of NAFTA in this adjustment mechanism, we use
¯rm-level data that contains information on production, employment, exports, and owner-
ship structure. The data are available for periods before, during, and after the two major
exchange rate crises shown in Figure 1. We compare the di®erences in behavior of ¯rms in
the aftermath of both episodes and argue that the di®erential in the response is due to the
implementation of NAFTA. An obvious concern with this inference is that Mexico under-
went other reforms between the two exchange rate crises. If this is the case, then it is not
clear that we can attribute the di®erent dynamics exclusively to NAFTA. Notwithstanding,
we will show in Section 5 that the extent of the other reforms in the Mexican economy was
limited and that NAFTA was the fundamental di®erence between both episodes.
3 Empirical Evidence
A simple comparison of trends in aggregate exports during and after the two major exchange
rate depreciations suggests that the introduction of NAFTA changed the Mexican economy.
4The need to reduce aggregate expenditure might be caused, for example, by a decrease in the amount
of external ¯nance available or a decline in the terms of trade.
4As the data in Table 1 shows, the growth rate of exports during the second real exchange
rate depreciation (the Tequila crisis) was signi¯cantly faster than the ¯rst (1986) crisis. It
is also very interesting to note that exports exhibit a much more dynamic behavior during
the appreciation phase. This simple evidence suggests that having access to the U.S. and
Canadian markets after 1995 bene¯ted the export sector. We now turn to analyze the
microeconomic evidence of this phenomenon.
3.1 Data
For our microeconomic analysis of the behavior of ¯rms during the two exchange rate crises
we rely on ¯rm-level data from the Annual Industry Survey (EIA) that is available since
1984.5 There are two di®erent con¯gurations of this survey: the \old" or \traditional" one,
that considered 129 industries within the manufacturing sector, and that covered the 1984-
1994 period; and the \new" structure, that covers 205 industries since 1993.6 In this paper
we will use the old data for 1984-1992 and the new data for 1993- 2001. In both cases, we
performed a thorough analysis of the data in order to use only the reliable observations, and
we decided to work only with balanced panels for each period.7
3.2 Basic Trends
Figure 2 shows the changes in employment during the two crisis periods, computed as the
percentage growth rates in employment.8 From now on we will refer to the ¯rst real exchange
rate shock as Episode 1 while the Tequila crisis well de referred to as Episode 2. In order
to make the contrast between both episodes as clear as possible, we present the information
in event-study type graphs centered in the year of each real exchange rate shock. Figure
2 shows clearly that employment grew signi¯cantly faster when NAFTA was in place. The
evidence also indicates that employment was more volatile during the second shock: the
5A more complete description of the data and the de¯nitions of the main variables is presented in the
Data Appendix.
6All of the industries covered in the old structure were covered in the new one, and the latter also included
some new industries. A very careful match was done between them, in order compare the information between
both periods, and also to create a panel for those ¯rms present in both series.
7Although it would be interesting to analyze entry and exit during these periods, the survey made not
e®ort to include newcomers, and the agency in charge of the survey (the Mexican Census Bureau, INEGI)
reports very little exit.
8Unless explicitly stated, all the data reported comes from the EIA survey. For 1984-1992 the balanced
panel consists of 1,467 ¯rms, and for 1993-2001 the panel has 3,899 ¯rms. The observations are not weighted
to try to replicate the population values, so the totals do not match macro data.
5drop in employment was smaller in 1986 than in 1995, and the increase in the aftermath of
the shock was signi¯cantly bigger in 1996 than in 1987.
These di®erences could be due to several factors. First, the 1995 shock was concentrated
in a few months, while the 1986 shock was more persistent. Also, the economy was in
the midst of a crisis in 1986, and the real exchange rate shock was another (possible not
unforeseeable) element of it, while in 1994 the economic climate was much more favorable
and a large depreciation was largely unexpected. We will also show that the recovery from
the \Tequila Crisis" was largely driven by exports, which were possible due to trade reform
in general and NAFTA in particular.
Figure 3 shows the growth rates in exports during both episodes.9 Although exports
did increase signi¯cantly after the 1986-1987 real exchange rate shock (at an average rate of
11.2% for 1987-1990), the export boom of 1995 was spectacular (exports increased by 83%
in the ¯rms sampled by EIA), and it was sustained until 2000. Complementary data for all
exports of the manufacturing sector (excluding maquiladoras10) is presented in Figure 4. It
shows that exports grew steadily from 1982-1993, with a dip in 1985 followed by a recovery
in 1986, the year of the ¯rst real exchange rate shock and also one year after Mexico joined
the GATT. Starting in 1994 (the year NAFTA began) a change in trend is observed, which
is accentuated in 1995, when exports increased from 27 to 40 billion dollars.
3.3 Does Export-Status Matter to Post-Crisis Adjustments?
Using the balanced panel for 1984-1992, it is possible to analyze the performance of ¯rms
during the 1986 real exchange rate shock. Given that, in principle, the shock was a positive
event for ¯rms that exported, we want to determine whether exporters actually had an
advantage over non-exporters. For this we would like to identify exporters in 1984 or 1985,
before the shock, and compare their performance during and after the shock. Unfortunately,
9Export data are available starting 1986 but it was not collected in 1991, 1992 and 1994. However,
the \new" panel has export data for all years starting in 1993. This explains the gap in Figure 3 and the
impossibility of doing a proper event-like study as the one done in Figure 2. See Data Appendix for further
details on the characteristics of the EIA.
10Maquiladoras are an important sector within manufacturing in Mexico. They are mainly foreign-owned
plants performing assembly activities, and they are heavily concentrated both regionally (in the border
states) and industry-wise (in textiles, electronics and auto-industry). Although the share of total imports
and exports in manufacturing that pertains to maquiladoras is very high (about 50%), it is conceptually
necessary not to include this sector in the analysis. These ¯rms are required to export all of their output,
and virtually all of their inputs (approximately 90-95%) are imported free of duty. Maquiladoras' dynamics
are related to the U.S. economic cycle, and not at all to the situation of Mexico's domestic market. We
will come back to this sector later, because it constitutes a good control group, whose behavior will help us
strengthen our conclusions.
6in the \old" panel exports are only available for 1986-1990, and in 1992. Therefore, we will
only be able to compare ex-post exporters with ex-post non-exporters. We selected 1986 as
the year of reference, the ¯rst for which the information if available. We analyze the second
real exchange rate shock with the balanced panel of ¯rms for the period 1993-2001. For
comparability with the data available in the old panel we selected ¯rms that did and did not
export in 1995.11
Figures 5 and 6 show the \bene¯t" of being an exporter during the two real exchange
rate shock episodes. The ¯rst ¯gure presents the di®erence in employment growth between
exporters and non-exporters, while the second depicts the di®erence in total sales growth
between the two groups. We refer to this di®erence in the behavior of exporters and non-
exporters as the exporters' premium. The evidence is also presented in event-study type
graphs, analogous to Figure 2. As Figure 5 reveals, exporters exhibited a higher growth
rate of employment when the real exchange rate shock was accompanied by NAFTA. This
is especially the case in the year after the shock: the exporters' premium for employment is
almost three percentage points in Episode 2 but close to zero in Episode 1.
More detailed evidence of the path of the exporters' premium can be found in Table 2.
During the ¯rst real exchange rate shock, the excess growth rate of employment for exporters
was positive in the year previous to the shock (1985), and remained positive (although small)
through 1989. There is little evidence of a divergence between exporters and non-exporters
during the shock. It was not until 1991-1992 (when the aggregate data in Table 3 shows a
weakening in export growth) that the exporters' premium became negative. The data for
the second real exchange rate shock present a very di®erent behavior. Before the shock,
when the peso was strong, employment growth was 1.9 percent lower at exporters than
non-exporters. The year of the shock exporters performed substantially better than non-
exporters (1.8 points), and the premium was even larger in 1996 and 1997 (2.8 and 2.2
percentage points, respectively). Finally, the positive premium disappeared and became
negative in the appreciation phase (1998-2001). Hence, during the second episode a strong
di®erence opened up in the performance of exporters vis-µ a-vis non-exporters, that was not
present during the ¯rst crisis.
The sales data in Figure 6 con¯rm the story suggested by the employment data: ex-
porters' relative performance was more strongly a®ected during the second episode. Although
the growth in sales was 6.7 points higher for exporters in 1985, after the onset of the ¯rst
exchange shock sales growth of exporters actually fell below the growth of non-exporters.
In contrast, during Episode 2 one observes an opposite behavior: the exporters' premium is
extremely high, close to 20 percentage points.
11We repeated the analysis using also the ex-ante exporters, those that exported in 1993. The results
are very similar, and all the conclusions that follow from analyzing ex-post exporters hold when ex-ante
exporters are examined.
7The complete path of the exporters' premium for total sales is presented in Table 3. It
indicates that, after the ¯rst real exchange rate shock, the exporters' premium continued to
be positive for some years. On the other hand, the exporters' premium after the second real
exchange rate shock decreases signi¯cantly and turns negative three years after the shock.The
smaller di®erences observed since 1996 probably re°ect the recovery of the domestic economy,
and thus of non-exporters, and the disadvantages of exporters in the appreciation phase.12
These raw di®erences suggest that there was a stronger response of exporters during the
second real exchange rate shock, although probably the di®erential performance is smaller
over the long run. However, the evidence discussed so far fails to consider other di®erences
between exporters and non-exporters that could be relevant, such as industry, size and foreign
ownership. These issues will be addressed next in a regression analysis.
3.4 Regression Analysis
In order to further explore the ¯ndings in Figure 5 and 6, we perform a regression analysis
to measure the performance of exporters vis--vis non-exporters in both real exchange rate
shock episodes, using employment, sales and expenses in new investment as the variables
of interest. The idea is to control for other variables that could explain a di®erential per-
formance between exporters and non-exporters (besides their ability to capture the bene¯ts
from trade liberalization), such as the industry, the ¯rm size and foreign ownership.13 For-
eign ownership could explain the di®erential performance of exporters in the second shock: if
exporters were more likely to be foreign in the 90s than in the 80s, and if being foreign-owned
provides with advantages to ¯rms (such as easier access to credit, which would be crucial
when domestic credit is not available), then failure to control for ownership status could lead
to faulty inferences.14 Our regression models are of the following form:
12It is interesting to note that the di®erences in employment and total sales growth between the two
periods disappear if we average them (or take the compound growth rates) over the whole period. This is
so because the downside for exporters in the appreciation phase is also higher during the second episode.
13Firm size is measured by the log of total employment, the log of total sales or by the log capital stock;
four-digit (time-invariant) industry dummies are included to capture any industry peculiarities, and the
share of capital owned by foreigners is used to construct foreign-ownership indicators.
14To capture these possible e®ects, we de¯ned an indicator for ¯rms with a share of FDI of 40% or larger,
and the coe±cient of this variable was allowed to vary by year. (The indicator is constant for a given
¯rm in either the old or new panel, because the foreign ownership variable is available for only one year
in each panel, (an unknown year between 1986 and 1990 for the old panel, and 1994 for the new panel).
We also included an interaction of export-status and foreign ownership, and its coe±cient also varied by
year. However, this interaction term was almost never signi¯cant. In every case the sign and signi¯cance
of the export coe±cients (reported in the following tables) did not change, and the point estimates were
not meaningfully di®erent. For these reasons, the ¯nal set of regressions included only the FDI indicators










s ¢ YEARs + Á ¢ SECTOR + ­Zit + ²it (1)
where Yit the outcome measure (growth in sales, employment, or investment) of ¯rm i in
period t, DX is a dummy variable for the exporter status of the ¯rm in a given period (1986
in the old panel, and 1993 or 1995 in the new panel), YEARs is a year dummy for period
s, SECTOR are 4-digit sector level dummies, Z is matrix of additional controls like foreign
ownership of the ¯rm and lags of the Y and Z variables, and "it is a random error. The
coe±cients of interest are the °s, which measure the premium of exporters, in di®erent years.
Our strategy consists in estimating equation 1 separately for each of the di®erent real
exchange rate depreciation episodes denoted by T and compare the value of the ° coe±cients
obtained in each one of them. For the ¯rst episode T 2 [1985;1992] and for the second
oneT 2 [1994;2001].
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the values of the estimated °'s when the outcome measure
Yit is employment, total sales and investment respectively. As can be seen, it is clearly the
case that exporters exhibited higher growth rates of employment and sales as well as bigger
investment rates during the second episode indicating that NAFTA, by allowing Mexican
producers to export more to the U.S. market, made a signi¯cant di®erence for the response
to the real exchange rate shock. Next, we discuss in more detail the regressions from where
the estimates shown in ¯gures 7 to 9 are taken.
Table 4 shows the regression results for the ¯rst real exchange rate shock. Using the
balanced panel of ¯rms (1467 observations per year) for 1984-1992, the percentage change in
employment and in total sales is regressed on an indicator of export-status in 1986, which is
allowed to have a year speci¯c coe±cient, industry and year dummies, an indicator variable
for foreign ownership (whose e®ect may vary by year), and a variable that captures the size
of the ¯rm (lagged employment, sales or capital). The results con¯rm the previous ¯ndings:
exporters (as of 1986) did not bene¯t much from the real exchange rate shock in the late
1980s. There are some signi¯cant gains in employment growth in 1987, but these are smaller
than those reported for the second real exchange rate shock, and vanish by 1988. Some
relative bene¯ts are found for sales in 1986, but these are also much smaller than in the
second episode.15 Larger di®erences arise between exporters and non-exporters in the early
nineties, when exporters had a weaker performance than non-exporters.
15It is important to note, as shown in Tables 2 and 3 that the small di®erences between exporters and
non-exporters in the ¯rst real exchange rate shock existed when the overall recovery of the economy was
rather slow, while during the second real exchange rate shock the di®erences occurred in midst of a general
recovery (starting in 1996-1997). This suggests that the larger and more persistent bene¯ts by exporters
during the second shock were arguably more meaningful.
9For the second real exchange rate episode, Table 5 reports similar regressions for ex-
porters selected in 1995.16 The results are also consistent with the discussion so far: exporters
bene¯ted signi¯cantly from the real exchange rate shock. While there were no signi¯cant
di®erences in terms of employment growth between exporters and non-exporters in 1994,
between 1995 and 1997 exporters' employment grew 2-6 percentage points more than similar
non-exporters. In 1999 exporters began to perform below non-exporters, and this pattern
continued into 2001. With respect to total sales, the models in Table 5 show that exporters
performed better than non-exporters in 1994, but the di®erence was 3-4 times larger in 1995.
In the following years the di®erential was much smaller, and even negative by 1999-2001.
These ¯gures also validate the earlier results.
Tables 6 shows a parallel set of models for ¯rm investment. The dependent variable
in each case is the log of spending in new investment, and either the lagged value of the
dependent variable or the log of capital at the beginning of the year is included as an
independent variable. The results in the right panel con¯rm the superior relative performance
of exporters in the second real exchange rate episode. The left panel shows the results for
the old panel: all the estimated coe±cients on exporter status are small or approximately
zero. By comparison, results for the second crisis episode, shown in the right-hand column
of Table 6, show more rapid growth in investment by exporters in response to the crisis.17;18
3.5 Robustness of the Results
We performed several checks to test the robustness of the results. First, we allowed the
coe±cient of industry to vary over time, repeating the analysis using four digit industry
dummies interacted with year dummies.19 The results remain largely unchanged, as shown
in Tables 1 to 3 in the appendix.
We also restricted the analysis to include only ¯rms that did not export more than
16As stated before, the ideal group to study the e®ects of the real exchange rate shock would the ex-ante
exporters. Those are the ¯rms that already exported in 1993. Notwithstanding, the group of exporters in
1995 is shown in order to compare this group (with all the selection caveats) with a similar group during the
¯rst episode, when the ideal group is not available.
17Note that the coe±cients are not directly comparable, for the concepts classi¯ed as expenditures in new
investment di®er between the old panel and the new panel. The purpose of the table is to show di®erence
in the patterns within each real exchange rate shock episode.
18Table 6 presents the results with exporters selected in 1993, before the real exchange rate shock. The
results with the exporters selected in 1995 are almost identical and are available upon request.
19Arguably, the inclusion of industry¤year e®ects may be considered over controlling, for some four-digit
industries may have \good" performance during some years precisely because of the high share of ¯rms that
export in that industry. So, it is reasonable to expect that some of the \true" export e®ect will be captured
by the inclusion of these interaction terms.
1075% of their output every year, for these ¯rms could be a®ected more by external demand
shocks, independent from the real exchange rate shock. Excluding these ¯rms does not alter
the results: exporters bene¯ted more from the post-NAFTA real exchange rate shock than
they did from the shock in the late 1980s. The point estimates are slightly smaller, especially
for sales in 1995, but the overall message from these regressions is the same as that from the
previous analysis.20 We also excluded small ¯rms, de¯ned as those with total employment
smaller than ¯fty workers every year.21 This is a small group of ¯rms, and not considering
them did not alter the results in a meaningful way.22
Finally, we repeated the analysis using only the ¯rms in the long panel (1984- 2001).23
This was done to address the plausible concern that most of the di®erent response of exports
was driven by new ¯rms that did not exist during the ¯rst RER depreciation.24 The results,
although not as strong, remain qualitatively unchanged (as seen in Tables 6 and 7 in the
appendix) and they con¯rm the pattern described so far. Even holding the set of ¯rms
constant, exporters performed much better vis--vis non-exporters during the second real
exchange rate shock, and the overall response of exports to the devaluations was stronger in
the post-NAFTA shock.
20In the regressions throughout the paper we de¯ne as exporters ¯rms with any exports in a given year.
Alternatively, one could either use the export share or restrict exporters to ¯rms with a share of exports
greater than X% of total sales. When restricting the analysis to exclude ¯rms that export a certain share of
their exports on every year we used two cut points: 50% and 75%. The results suggest that the lower the
cut-o® point, the less strong and signi¯cant the results, thus suggesting that the higher the export share,
the larger the bene¯ts for exporters.
21In this case we also used several cut-o® points: twenty-¯ve, forty and ¯fty. We show the results for the
latter case, but in all of them the results are virtually indistinguishable from those shown in the previous
section
22These speci¯cations are shown in regressions 4 and 5 in the appendix. Those tables resemble the main
tables in the paper (Tables 4 and 5); the ¯rst column is a copy from the regression with the complete sample;
then we show the results restricting the sample to exclude high-export ¯rms (more than 75% of sales exported
each year) and then we show the results from excluding small ¯rms. As the tables show, the general results
hold. We do not show the results for the spending in new investment (Table 6) when restricting the sample
by size and high-export intensity. Those results are largely unchanged.
23There are 999 ¯rms that appear in both panels and that have reliable information and that do not have
missing or \strange" values for the most important variables that we use.
24If this were the case, one could argue that other factors (besides NAFTA) determined the creation of
¯rms capable of seizing the opportunity represented by the devaluation. Note that ¯rms present in the new
panel but not in the old one are not necessarily new ¯rms (in the sense of them being created after the old
panel was selected). Di®erent sample designs and di®erent data availability does not allow to infer that a
¯rm present in the new panel only is of recent creation. To illustrate, although the long panel has 999 ¯rms
with complete information, in principle at least 400 ¯rms with complete data for the new panel exist in the
old panel, but with incomplete information.
113.6 Who is exporting more? A closer look at the Exporting Firms
An important question is which ¯rms exported more during the second real exchange rate
shock: was it new exporters or was it ¯rms that had a previous exporting experience? The
data shows that as a share of total exports, it is the old exporters the group that export
by far the largest share. For example, if in the long panel we follow exporters as of 1986
and compute their share of total exports we get that they exported 93% of the total exports
between 1987 and 1990, and they still represented about 84% of the exports in the 1993-
2001 period. These ¯gures suggest that the group of ¯rms that exported in 1986 (and that
are still present in 2001) were able to adapt and to increase exports after NAFTA and after
the second real exchange rate shock. If we use the \new" panel only, then we get the same
result. Following the share of total exports from exporters in 1993, we ¯nd that in 1995 it
was 95%, and it did not fall from 93% for the 1994-2001 period.
This discussion does not imply that the di®erent response of exporters vis a vis non-
exporters among both episodes is driven by the \old" exporters. It could be the case that,
since exporting requires experience that accumulates over time, exports might react more to
a second RER shock only because the di®erence in experience and not because tari®s in the
destination market have declined among both episodes. To discard this case we estimated
our base equation (1) for the sub-sample of ¯rms that we observe over the complete period
1985-2001 instead of the intervals 1985-1992 and 1994-2001 that we have used so far. To test
for the relevance of the experience in exporting mechanism we selected exporters in 1986, the
earliest available date for which exporter status is available. If experience of exporting ¯rms
explains the di®erent behavior, the ° coe±cient in a regression like (1) after the second shock
should be bigger than the one observed after the ¯rst shock. On the contrary, the results
of this regression indicate that both coe±cients are identical at the standard con¯dence
levels.25 Therefore we can reject the hypothesis that the di®erence on the level of exporters'
experience is the factor driving our main results.
4 Further Analysis: Exploring the Link Between Tari®
Reduction and Mexico's Manufacturing Activity
We have documented that exporters reacted in a much more favorable way during the post-
NAFTA real exchange rate shock than during the pre-NAFTA shock, and we argued that
NAFTA contributed to this di®erent response. The results did not change in a signi¯cant way
25The results of the regression are not reported in the paper but are available from the authors upon
reques.
12when several robustness tests were done. Here we extend the analysis in order to strengthen
our conclusion of the centrality of NAFTA in explaining the export boom of 1995. We will
also provide additional evidence from the U.S. trade data to corroborate the mechanism by
which NAFTA acted, namely by providing ¯rms in Mexico access to the U.S. market.
4.1 Maquiladoras as a Control Group
The ¯rst set of evidence we present concerns the behavior of the Maquiladora sector in Mexico
during both exchange rate shocks. Although we excluded maquiladoras from our main
analysis, this group of ¯rms constitutes a control group, in the sense that the expected e®ect
of each real exchange rate shock should have been similar in both episodes. By de¯nition
maquiladoras operate under zero-tari®s, so they had \complete access" to the U.S. market
during both real exchange rate shocks. Hence, we expect that they should have responded
similarly during both RER shocks. Figure 10 suggests that the behavior of the maquiladora
sector to both RER shocks was indeed very similar. We will now provide regression evidence
that con¯rms this preliminary evidence.
The ideal setup would be to have a long panel of maquiladoras, and to measure the
response of individual ¯rms during the devaluations. Unfortunately, data for maquiladoras
are not available at the ¯rm level for the 1980s, so we can only use aggregate data for this
sector of the Mexican economy. For this we gather data on the total exports of manufactured
goods of the maquiladora and non-maquiladora sectors for the period 1980-2006 and run the
following regression separately for each of those sectors:
¢Et = ¯0 + ¯1¢RERt¡1 + ¯2[¢RERt¡1 ¤ NAFTA] + ¯3NAFTA + ²t (2)
where Et represents total exports in year t, RERt is Mexico's real exchange rate de¯ned
in such a way that and increase in RER corresponds to a real depreciation of the Mexican
currency and NAFTA is a dummy variable equal to one for the period of NAFTA (1994
onwards) and 0 otherwise. We include the RER lagged one period in (2). First the behavior of
the data presented in Figure 10 suggests that Maquiladora exports react with a lag of one year
to changes in the RER. On the other hand, introducing the RER lagged reduces problems
of reverse causality that could arise in 2 if this variable was introduced contemporaneously
in that equation.
For our hypothesis that NAFTA made exports more sensible to real exchange rate
changes to be supported by the evidence, the coe±cient ¯2 in regression (2) should be
13positive for the non-maquila sector and zero for the maquila sector. This is precisely what
we ¯nd after running the regressions as is reported in Table 7. 26 This provides evidence
in favor of our hypothesis that NAFTA increased the sensitivity of Mexico's non-maquila
manufacturing exports to changes in the real exchange rate.
4.2 Tari®s and Exports: Direct Evidence
Now we turn to evidence on the mechanism that we argue is behind the di®erent responses
of the Mexican manufacturing sector to the two exchange rate shocks: the lower U.S. tari®s
charged to Mexican exports in the post-NAFTA era. In particular, we will analyze the
behavior of Mexican exports to the U.S. in the aftermath of the tequila crises and how its
dynamics were in°uenced by the tari® reduction brought by NAFTA.
The evidence comes from highly disaggregated trade and tari® data published by the
U.S. International Trade Commission and processed by John Romalis.27 The data contains
information on the tari®s charged to Mexican products sold in the U.S. during the period
1989 to 2001 and on the volume of imports from Mexico and other countries. The data are
classi¯ed using the Harmonized Tari® Schedule (HTS) designed by the US Census Bureau and
we use the 6-digit sub classi¯cation that comprises approximately 4200 product categories.
We use this data to examine the relation between tari®s reductions and the exports of
Mexico's manufacturing sector with cross-section regressions of the form:
Yi = ´¢TARi + µL¢TARi + #i (3)
where Yi is an outcome measure for sector i (either the growth rate of Mexican imports or
the change in the market share of Mexican imports), TARi is the tari® charged in the U.S.
to goods produced by sector i, ¢ is the ¯rst di®erence operator, L is the lag operator, #i is
a random error and ´ and µ are the coe±cients to be estimated.28 This strategy helps us to
26It should be noted that the small sample size makes it di±cult to reject the hypothesis that the ¯2
coe±cient is di®erent from zero. Nevertheless, the ¯nding that the point estimate of ¯2 is positive for non-
maquila exports and zero for the maquila sector is robust across all the speci¯cations presented in Table
7.
27See Romalis (2004) for details on how the tari® data is constructed. The trade data is taken from the
US International Trade Commission (USITC) web-based database.
28It would be interesting to include measures of non-tari® barriers in regression 3 but unfortunately there
is no systematic data on them. See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for the enormous limitations of the
scarce data on non-tari® barriers. On the other hand, non-tari® barriers (e.g. quotas) appear to be much
14clarify the importance of NAFTA tari®s reductions especially when the outcome variables
Yi are measured in 1995. Since the real exchange rate shock a®ected all manufacturing
sectors in that year the variation in the tari® reduction across di®erent sectors will indicate
if NAFTA made a di®erence. Given the timing of the events, it is crucial to include the
lagged change in tari®s: the biggest tari® reductions occurred between 1994 and 1993 while
the tequila crises occurred one year later.
The evidence clearly indicates that NAFTA eased the access of Mexico's goods to the
U.S. market. First, we look at Mexican exports of all types of goods to the U.S. in 1994, the
year NAFTA was implemented (we exclude the lagged change in tari®s from this analysis).
The results presented in Table 8 indicate that the market share of Mexican goods increased
more in sectors with bigger tari® reductions. Likewise, Table 9 shows that the growth rate of
exports increased more in sectors with bigger tari®s cuts. Finally, and most relevant to our
paper, the sectors that exhibited the biggest increases in exports in the year that followed
the Tequila crisis (1995) were those that had experienced the biggest tari® reductions in
1994. This is seen in the negative and signi¯cant coe±cient of the lagged change in tari®s
in Table 10.
The next step is to redo the analysis in Tables 8 to 10 but now looking only at man-
ufacturing goods.29 The results of these regressions are presented in Tables 11 to 13 and
they con¯rm the results obtained previously: reductions in tari®s brought by NAFTA in-
creased the Mexican exports to the US even after considering the e®ect of the signi¯cant
real exchange rate depreciation observed in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis.
As an additional test we explored directly if the interaction between changes in the
RER and tari®s has an e®ect on the behavior of Mexican exports to the US. On other words
we test directly if exports growth would be higher for those sectors that experienced the
biggest reductions in tari®s which is the main hypothesis of this paper. This test is done
with the following regression (¢ corresponds to the ¯rst di®erence operator and ln denotes
the natural logarithm):
¢ln(Exports)jt = ¯1¢ln(RER)t¡1 + ¯2¢¿jt + ¯3¢ln(RER)t¡1¢¿jt + Áj + ²jt (4)
more common for agricultural goods than for manufactures. The evidence presented in Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004) documents that this is the case for the U.S. Unfortunately, there is no information on how
non-tari® barriers have changed over time.
29As explained earlier, manufacturing activities are classi¯ed according to the NAICS system. Since the
trade data is classi¯ed according to the HTS system it is necessary to reclassify the trade data to the NAICS
system. Fortunately the US Census provides a concordance ¯le that allows to transform the information
presented in HTS code to NAICS classi¯cation.
15According to our hypothesis to explain the di®erent behavior of exporting ¯rms during
both episodes, we expect that the coe±cient ¯3 in regression (4) should be negative: for a
given depreciation of the RER in the previous year (t¡1), exports from Mexico to the US of
sector j goods in year t will increase more the higher the reduction in tari®s for that sector.
Tari®s applied in the U.S. to in year t to Mexican goods of sector j are measured by ¿jt.
The estimation of regression (4) poses a number of challenges. First, we would like
to estimate it with a sample that covers the RER shocks of 1987 and 1995. Unfortunately
there is no data source that combines both bilateral trade and tari® information at the
sector level over the complete period. The longest available sample with data suitable to
estimate (4) starts in 1991 and this will be the one we will use. The second challenge is to
get tari® and bilateral data that is consistent with one another. For this we used again data
from the USITC. This implies that our dependent variable in equation (4) will be imports
from Mexico to the U.S. reported by the USITC. With this we assure that the tari® data
is entirely consistent with the trade °ows. Tari® rates at the sector level are calculated also





Finally, the RER data comes from the Bank of Mexico and the annual observation
corresponds to the average of the monthly observations for each year. The RER is de¯ned
such that an increase in this variable corresponds to a real depreciation of the Mexican
currency. The real depreciation enters with one lag to minimize problems of endogeneity
with the dependent variable.
The results of regression (4) are presented in Table 14 and the evidence strongly sup-
ports the claim that Mexican exports to the U.S. increased more for those sector for which
tari®s decline (i.e. ¢¿jt < 0) and that this e®ect reinforced the competitive boost given by
a real deprecation of Mexico's currency.
As a ¯nal test of the relevance of NAFTA's tari® reductions for the dynamics of Mex-
ico's manufacturing, we analyze the extent to which the decision to export is in°uenced by
the reduction in tari®s. In order to examine the e®ect of tari®-reduction on entry into the
export activity, we did an analysis of the probability that a ¯rm started to export, based
on the change in the tari®s that it faced one and two years before the decision to export
was taken. For this exercise, we used the tari® data at the four-digit level, and computed
the yearly changes in tari®s for the period 1989-2001.30 Given data limitations we were only
30For a description on the tari® data, see the Data Appendix. The tari®s refer to those faced by Mexican
16able to model the relationship between changes in tari®s and entry into exporting activities
for the period 1994-2001. We estimated a simple random e®ects probit model on the panel,
using both the long panel and the new panel. This model is in the following form:











where Yijt is and indicator on whether the ¯rm i in industry j exported in period t, given
that it has not exported in the past. ¢Tj is the change in the tari® charged in the U.S. to
goods produced by sector j, and ¢RERt is the change in the real exchange rate; D
y
t is the
year dummy for period t, while DIND2
r is the two-digit industry dummy for industry r31; ¢
is the ¯rst di®erence operator and L is the lag operator. The coe±cients to be estimated are
°;µ;» and Ã and the vectors ·t and ¸r.
Table 15 shows the results from the regressions for the new panel.32 For each year, only
the non-exporters on the previous period were included. Besides the change in tari®s, lagged
one and two periods, other covariates are considered: two-digit industry dummies (columns
1, 3 and 4), year dummies (column 2 and 3), and the real exchange rate depreciation (for the
two previous years, column 4). Although the signi¯cance level is smaller when year-dummies
are included, the results con¯rm that there was a positive impact of the reduction on tari®s
on the probability of switching to exporter status.33 Even though we cannot compare the
e®ect of tari® reductions in the two crisis periods (due to the lack of data on tari®s for
the earlier period)34, it is important to stress that the e®ect of tari®s is present even after
controlling for unrestricted time dummies, which capture all economy-wide in°uences.
¯rms when trading with the U.S.
31Tari®s are computed for each four-digit industry, while dummies are included for each two-digit industry
32The results for the long panel are shown in the appendix. Although the signi¯cance of the coe±cients
on the tari®s is smaller, the general results hold. It is important to stress that the ¯rms in the new panel
that do not appear in the long panel are not necessarily new ¯rms (i.e. ¯rms established recently). More
¯rms are included in the new panel due to sampling and design issues.
33It would be ideal to know the country to which ¯rms exported; however, that information is not available
on the data.
34Nevertheless, it is likely that during the ¯rst shock the change in the tari®s faced by Mexican ¯rms in
the US market did not change signi¯cantly, or if they did the changes were not only for Mexico, for there
were no bilateral trade agreements between the US and Mexico at that time.
175 Did Everything Else Remain Constant?
The Mexican economy has undergone a process of economic reform that started in part
after the debt crisis of 1982. Moreover, this process was accelerated after the 1986 exchange
rate shock. The possibility that reforms other than NAFTA occurred between the ¯rst real
exchange rate crisis and the second is important, since it would lead us to overstate the e®ect
of NAFTA. For this reason, in this section we summarize the extent of other reforms to gauge
the likelihood that they have contributed to altering the response of manufacturing ¯rms to
exchange rate shocks. As we will explain, in general reforms other than trade are not likely
to have caused signi¯cant impacts in the response of the Mexican manufacturing to real
exchange rate shocks, and in general to the Mexican economy. The only likely exception is
the privatization of the Mexico's telecommunications and roads networks that have produced
noticeable changes in those sectors. We turn now to discussing the extent and depth of each
of the other reforms undertaken in Mexico since the mid 1980s'.35
Financial liberalization, undertaken after 1989, is one of the key changes other than
trade reform introduced in Mexico after 1986. In theory a successful ¯nancial reform will
lead to more e±cient capital markets that will improve access to ¯nancing allowing ¯rms
to respond better to shocks. In the context of this paper, one can imagine that an export-
oriented ¯rm that faces a favorable price shock will increase its production more when it has
access to a deeper ¯nancial market. By the same token, that same ¯rm will be able to invest
more when the expectations of future pro¯ts increase if ¯nancial markets are more developed.
In spite of this, the empirical evidence does not indicate that ¯nancial liberalization eased
the credit market restrictions faced by ¯rms. It is also important to consider that the 1995
crisis involved a collapse of the recently privatized banking industry, and a virtual stall to
credit. So, if producers responded di®erently in the 1990s it was not because of the reforms
to the ¯nancial sector.
Gelos and Werner (2002) study the e®ects of ¯nancial liberalization using a sample of
manufacturing ¯rms during 1984-1994. They ran the standard test of cash °ow sensibility
of investment before and after the reforms of ¯nancial sector. In practice this means adding
a dummy variable after 1989 when they date the ¯nancial liberalization. The results do not
reveal a signi¯cant ease of access to credit market constraints except for the \very small"
¯rms in the sample. In other words, the importance of cash °ow availability for investment
after ¯nancial liberalization was put in place diminished only for a subset of ¯rms.36 For our
purposes, the results of Gelos and Werner (2002) indicate that ¯nancial liberalization did not
imply a signi¯cant ease of ¯nancial constraints for ¯rms in the manufacturing sector. In other
35See Aspe (1993) and Lustig (2002) for general references on the evolution of the Mexican economy during
that period.
36A ¯rm belongs to the \very small" group if it has less than 40 and more than 3 employees. This group
comprises 84 ¯rms out of the total 1046 ¯rms in the sample.
18words, the available research does not indicate that ¯nancial reforms would have allowed
Mexican producers, through more ample access to ¯nancial resources, to take advantage of
the real exchange depreciation and increase their production and exports.
Along with this microeconomic evidence, other indicators traditionally used to measure
¯nancial development also present a mixed picture on the real extent of ¯nancial develop-
ment. These indicators are presented in Table 16. As it can be seen, even though the amount
of credit provided to the private sector increased signi¯cantly between both episodes, other
indicators like the ratio of M3 to GDP remained basically unchanged. The same is true
of indicators of stock market development that show a remarkable increase in the value of
traded ¯rms but not in the liquidity of the stock market or a signi¯cant increase in the
number of ¯rms that gained access to this type of ¯nancing. All these suggest that it is
unlikely that ¯nancial markets underwent a signi¯cant reform between 1986 and 1994.37;38
In contrast to ¯nancial markets, the telecommunications sector and the road network
exhibited signi¯cant improvements after the 1986 real exchange rate shock. The develop-
ment of both types of infrastructure can be clearly appreciated in Table 16. This evidence
diminishes the importance of trade reform and NAFTA as the unique cause of the di®erent
response of Mexican manufacturing ¯rms to each real exchange rate shock. Nevertheless,
one could argue that the improvement of the telecommunications infrastructure is more an
element that contributed to avoid a bottleneck in order to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties presented by NAFTA rather than an opportunity in itself. From this perspective then,
NAFTA is the \true" improvement in Mexico.
The assertion that improved infrastructure (roads and telecommunications) did not
play such an important role in the di®erent response of manufacturing exports and em-
ployment observed in both depreciation episodes, is also supported by the dynamics of the
maquiladora sector. As discussed in section 4.1, the response of maquiladoras' exports in
both real exchange depreciations is extremely similar. If better communication networks
increased signi¯cantly the production capacity of ¯rms, one would expect a much bigger of
response maquiladora activity during the second episode.39
The observed improvement in the telecommunications and road networks are part of
37Table 16 shows a very signi¯cant increase in Domestic Credit to the Private Sector between both periods.
This indicator has been singled out as one of the best measures of ¯nancial reform. From this perspective
the failure to detect any e®ect of ¯nancial liberalization on ¯rms' as reported by Gelos and Werner (2002)
is somewhat puzzling. A possible explanation is that most of this credit was channeled to households to
¯nance consumption as has been observed similar episodes of credit booms in other developing countries.
38Tornell, Westermann, and Mart¶ ³nez (2004) also provide evidence of limited reform in the ¯nancial sector
and claim that it remains a bottleneck for Mexico's economic development.
39As stated before, this suggests the need of a better understanding of the determinants of the maquiladora
sector dynamics.
19the privatization program of Mexico's government. This program was especially active in the
mid 1980s and early 1990s. Since the privatization process occurs roughly in between both
real exchange rate shocks it could also be the case that it in°uenced the di®erent behavior
of manufacturing ¯rms after each shock. However, a careful examination of the Mexican
experience suggests that this is not the case. For starters, the most notorious privatizations
took place outside the manufacturing sector, namely the telephone monopoly (TELMEX),
the banking industry, airlines and mining. Besides, using data from the \old" panel, we ¯nd
that at most 5% of the total sales of the ¯rms in the panel correspond to ¯rms under public
ownership. The small presence of the public sector in manufacturing (except, of course, in
the oil industry which is still publicly owned) suggests that privatizations were not very
relevant.40
Apart than the privatization process that lead to the described improvements in the
road and telecommunications network, one needs to analyze other reforms in the public
sector. The indicators presented in Table 16 suggest that there was no signi¯cant reform of
Mexico's public sector institutions during the period of interest. The total tax burden and
the government size remained virtually unchanged. It is also interesting to note that the
implicit tax rate on imports also exhibits almost no modi¯cation between both real exchange
rate shocks.41 This indicates that the trade liberalization initiated by Mexico in the mid
1980s was not as deep as the one observed after NAFTA.42
Other indicators of institutional reform present a similar picture as the crude indica-
tors discussed in the preceding paragraph. This is also the conclusion of Easterly, Fiess,
and Lederman (2003) that use political risk indicators to conclude that there is still a large
institutions gap between Mexico and the U.S. The data they present also indicates that insti-
tutions didn't exhibit a signi¯cant improvement between the 1980s and the implementation
of NAFTA.43
Another important factor that might in°uence the dynamics of exports and their re-
action to a RER shock are transports costs. It might be the case that if transport costs
declined markedly during the episodes we study in this paper then the di®erent reaction in
exports might be due to this element and not lower trade barriers. To gauge the plausibil-
ity of this hypothesis we gathered data on transport costs for Mexican exports to the U.S.
from the USITC. In particular, the USITC reports Imports Charges that correspond to \the
aggregate cost of all freight, insurance and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties)" at
40Aspe (1993) describes in detail the Mexican privatization process.
41The tari® rate presented in Table 16 is calculated as the ratio of total tari® revenue to imports of goods
and services. The inclusion of services makes this implicit tari® rate be lower than the nominal tari®.
42The implicit tari® rate, calculated with the same method explained in the previous footnote, declines to
under 2% after 1995.
43Their data comes from Political Risk Services and measures the extent of corruption, rule of law and
e±ciency of the judiciary system. See in particular Table 5 in their paper.
20the good level of U.S. imports from Mexico. Then we can calculate a proxy of the fraction
of imported value to which transport costs correspond to with:
Transport Costjt =
Import Chargesjt
Import CIFjt ¡ Import Chargesjt
(7)
We computed (7) for each j-type good and calculated its annual average over all the
goods categories. The results are presented in Table 17 and indicate that there has been no
signi¯cant decline in the cost of shipping goods from Mexico to the U.S. during the sample
period. Since this result might appear in contradiction with the current discussion on the
reduction of transportation costs, it is important to remember that the bulk of Mexico-U.S.
trade is conducted by ground transportation. According to Hummels (2007), the decline of
transport costs observed recently in the world has been concentrated in maritime and air
freights so the results of Table 17 appear to be no anomaly. This evidence indicates then that
changes in transport costs are not very likely to have been an important force in explaining
the di®erent response of the manufacturing sector in both RER shock episodes.
Another element that can alter the behavior of the economy after a depreciation of the
real exchange rate is the structure of its foreign debt regarding both its currency composition
and maturity pro¯le. This issue has recently received careful scrutiny in the international
¯nance literature. To address this issue properly one should have detailed information on
the ¯rms' liability structure. Unfortunately, our data does not contain any information on
the ¯rms' liabilities. However, there are other pieces of evidence that indicate that ¯nan-
cial vulnerability did not change signi¯cantly between the two dates of interest. First, the
economy-wide information presented in Table 16 shows that although the total indebtedness
level declined signi¯cantly, the exposure to foreign currency °uctuations remained high and
the maturity structure was actually more tilted towards the short run in 1995 than in 1986.
Second, ¯rm-level data reported by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) indicates that foreign cur-
rency debt in Mexico in 1996 was high for Latin American standards.44 Morevoer, Pratap,
Lobato, and Somuano (2003) and Pratap and Urrutia (2004) report for a di®erent sample of
Mexican of ¯rms than the one we use here that dollar-denominated debt both as a fraction
of total exports and total debt increased steadily during the period 1989-1994. This suggests
that the negative worth e®ect brought by the RER shock is likely to have been stronger in
the second episode than in the ¯rst one. Hence, if anything, the e®ects of dollar-denominated
debt would have translated into a smaller response of exports during the Tequila crisis.
An additional factor that might in°uence the response of a ¯rm to a change in the
44The data of Bleakley and Cowan (2002) indicate that in 1996 the dollarization level of Mexican corpo-
rations liabilities averaged 20% of total assets. This is second only to Argentinean ¯rms and much higher
than the corresponding ¯gure observed in Chile, Colombia and Brazil.
21real exchange rate (or any other macroeconomic shock) is aggregate economic volatility. Ag-
gregate volatility is important because it in°uences the degree to which economic agents
perceive shocks as permanent or transitory. The rate of in°ation provides a good approxi-
mation to the aggregate level of macroeconomic volatility. It exhibits a signi¯cant decline
in period before the Tequila crisis compared to the one observed before 1986. Nevertheless,
the volatility of GDP does not appear to have been signi¯cantly di®erent between the two
real exchange rate exchange rate shocks as Figure 11 suggests.45
In relation to this point a recent paper by Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) argues
that macroeconomic volatility does not have a signi¯cant impact on the exporting behavior
of ¯rms. According to the results reported by those authors for the case of Colombia, a
doubling of the volatility of the real exchange rate has a quantitatively small e®ect on the
volume exported and on the number of ¯rms who decide to become exporters. It would be
interesting to study if these same results would hold for the case of Mexico but that study
is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this paper we interpret the ¯ndings
of Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) as evidence that changes in macroeconomic (e.g. real
exchange rate) volatility do not appear to have an important e®ect on the response of exports
to an exchange rate shock.
Another element that could explain the di®erent response of exporter to a real exchange
shock is the extent to which they are perceived as transitory or permanent phenomena. If the
1995 shock was perceived to be permanent while the 1987 to be transitory, then this fact will
trigger by itself a di®erent response of exporters. However the origin of both shocks makes
it very unlikely that they were judged as di®erent phenomena with regards to their expected
duration. As discussed earlier, both shocks were the result of a macroeconomic crises during
which the nominal exchange rate depreciated abruptly. Given the short term rigidity of
prices, the RER depreciated as well but this should have been perceived as a transitory
phenomena. This because none of the real determinants of the relative price of Mexican
and U.S. goods experienced a permanent change that would be consistent with a permanent
change of Mexico RER.46 Finally, it is a stylized fact observed in developing countries that
RER depreciations observed after ¯nancial crisis and/or abandonment of exchange rate pegs
are always reversed in some years so it is very unlikely that the expected duration of these
episodes was expected to be very di®erent.
Along with macroeconomic developments in Mexico, the business cycle in the United
45The series in Figure 11 corresponds to the standard deviation of the quarterly growth rate of seasonally
adjusted GDP. The seasonal adjustment terms are obtained from a regression of the original GDP series on
a time trend and quarterly dummies. After extracting the seasonal component of the series, we computed
the growth rate with respect to the preceding quarter and took the standard deviation of it over 8 preceding
quarters. This is the series we plot in Figure 11.
46By \real" determinants we refer to terms of trade, relative productivity of the tradable and non tradable
sectors and income-expenditure ratio.
22States also in°uences the dynamics of manufacturing productivity in Mexico. This is due to
the fact that the U.S. is the biggest buyer of Mexican products. Figure 12 shows that the
U.S. economy was not in a severe economic downturn or boom when the two real exchange
rate shocks that we are interested in studying took place. This discards the possibility that
the di®erent response of Mexican exports in both episodes is driven by the U.S. business
cycle.
Finally, we analyze the extent of trade liberalization that occurred before NAFTA.
Table 18 describes the process of unilateral trade liberalization that took place in Mexico's
manufacturing sector after 1985. The data show a signi¯cant reduction of the trade barriers
(tari®s and quotas) across all sectors of manufacturing sectors. Certainly this development
might have had important implications on the behavior of the manufacturing sector. Never-
theless, this reform is a unilateral trade reform: it doesn't alter the barriers faced by Mexican
exports in their destination market. Secondly, Table 18 indicates that trade liberalization
was more intense in the years 1985 to 1987 which coincide with the ¯rst real exchange rate
shock episode. Therefore, it does not appear to be the case that unilateral trade liberalization
changed signi¯cantly between both real exchange rate shock episodes.
The picture that emerges after analyzing all this evidence is that there were no other
signi¯cant changes other than trade reform and in particular NAFTA between both real
exchange rate shocks. This allows us to conclude that it is very likely that most of the
di®erent response of manufacturing ¯rms to the real exchange rate depreciation is due to
NAFTA.
6 Conclusion
Although the e®ects of NAFTA on the Mexican economy have been analyzed thoroughly,47
we contribute by comparing the response of the economy to similar real exchange crisis in the
absence and presence of this trade agreement. The evidence presented in this paper indicates
that NAFTA changed signi¯cantly the adjustment dynamics of the Mexican manufacturing
sector to a real exchange rate shocks. The bene¯ts that this brought in terms of higher levels
of employment and production during the severe Tequila crisis is an unaccounted, until now,
bene¯t of NAFTA for Mexico. Using microeconomic data on the behavior of ¯rms and on
Mexican imports to the U.S. we were able to show the di®erential performance during two
similar devaluations, one before and the other after NAFTA, and we also documented the
channel by which NAFTA contributed to this reality.
47See, for example, a collection of essays assessing the impact of NAFTA in Mexico ten years down the
road: Casares and Sobarzo (2004).
23There are various avenues for future research that our work suggests. One of these is to
analyze the extent to which trade reforms change the adjustment dynamics of other countries
to shocks in the real exchange rate. An element of particular interest is the role (if any)
played by free trade areas and unilateral trade liberalization on the sensitivity of exports to
changes in the real exchange rate. Further understanding of the dynamics of adjustment of
the export sector to changes in the real exchange rate is also an interesting topic for future
study. This is a topic of special relevance for developing and emerging economies where real
currency depreciations are often associated with declines in economic activity. In this sense,
a closer examination of the determinants of exporters' output could help design policies that
aim to increase the e±ciency of external adjustment.
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25Figure 2: Yearly Change in Employment
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27Figure 4: Total Manufacturing Exports
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Note: The data for this graph is reported in Table 2
For Episode 1 time t corresponds to 1986
For Episode 2 time t corresponds to 1995
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Note: The data for this graph is reported in Table 3
For Episode 1 time t corresponds to 1986
For Episode 2 time t corresponds to 1995
Before NAFTA
After NAFTA
30Figure 7: ° Coe±cients for Employment Regressions
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31Figure 8: ° coe±cients for Total Sales Regressions
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32Figure 9: ° coe±cients for Investment Regressions
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33Figure 10: Maquiladora Output and the Real Exchange Rate






1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Change in Total Output (%)
Lagged Change in Real Exchange Rate (%)
34Figure 11: Standard Deviation of Mexico's Growth Rate of GDP
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Episode 1 spans from first quarter of 1985 to fourth quarter of 1987
Episode 1 spans from first quarter of 1994 to fourth quarter of 1996
35Figure 12: Growth Rate United States GDP
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Episode 1 spans from first quarter of 1985 to fourth quarter of 1987
Episode 1 spans from first quarter of 1994 to fourth quarter of 1996
36Table 1: Aggregate Exports in Two Episodes
First Episode Second Episode
RER Appreciation RER Appreciation
Shock Phase Shock Phase
1984-1987 1987-1993 1994-1996 1996-2002
Total Exports Growth (%) 1;2 3.0 5.8 24.1 7.5
GDP Growth (%) 1;2 0.2 3.4 -0.7 3.7
Total Exports Growth (%) 1;3 -5.4 6.6 30.6 57.7
Manufacturing Exports Growth (%) 1;3 20.3 12.6 34.1 66.9
Source: Authors' calculations from World Development Indicators and Banco de Mexico data.
1 Average growth rate per year.
2 Calculated from national accounts constant Mexican pesos values.
3 Calculated from current dollar values. Does not include Maquila sector.
37Table 2: Employment Growth (%)
PANEL A
First Real Exchange Depreciation Episode (1986)
Exporters in 1986 Non-Exporters in 1986 Di®erence
1985 3.4 2.2 1.2
1986 1.0 0.2 0.8
1987 -0.7 -0.9 0.3
1988 1.4 0.8 0.6
1989 5.2 4.2 1.0
1990 2.4 2.8 -0.4
1991 -0.2 1.3 -1.5
1992 -3.1 -0.5 -2.6
PANEL B
Second Real Exchange Depreciation Episode (1995)
Exporters in 1995 Non-Exporters in 1995 Di®erence
1994 -1.1 0.8 -1.9
1995 -4.6 -6.3 1.7
1996 6.0 3.2 2.8
1997 7.9 5.7 2.2
1998 4.8 4.9 -0.1
1999 1.6 3.4 -1.8
2000 2.5 2.3 0.2
2001 -4.5 -0.2 -4.4
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EIA data.
38Table 3: Sales Growth (%)
PANEL A
First Real Exchange Depreciation Episode (1986)
Exporters in 1986 Non-Exporters in 1986 Di®erence
1985 9.2 2.5 6.7
1986 1.0 2.8 -1.8
1987 7.6 4.9 2.8
1988 4.4 2.9 1.5
1989 12.4 8.7 3.7
1990 4.7 -1.7 6.4
1991 1.8 4.1 -2.3
1992 3.1 3.5 -0.4
PANEL B
Second Real Exchange Depreciation Episode (1995)
Exporters in 1995 Non-Exporters in 1995 Di®erence
1994 9.6 7.1 2.6
1995 14.6 -4.7 19.2
1996 4.1 6.3 -2.2
1997 5.6 4.4 1.2
1998 1.8 4.4 -2.6
1999 -1.5 2.1 -3.6
2000 5.1 2.8 2.3
2001 -5.2 0.8 -6.0
Source: Authors' calculations based on the EIA data.
Sales are measured in real Mexican pesos of 2002.
39Table 4: Employment and Total Sales Growth in First Episode
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1985 0.0026 -0.00602 -0.00728 0.01413 -0.0108 -0.00676
[0.01125] [0.01130] [0.01132] [0.02639] [0.02662] [0.02660]
°1986 0.01362 0.00498 0.00372 0.05954* 0.03432 0.03842
[0.01213] [0.01221] [0.01213] [0.02420] [0.02430] [0.02420]
°1987 0.03540** 0.02666* 0.02534* 0.04177 0.0151 0.0193
[0.01207] [0.01220] [0.01203] [0.02608] [0.02611] [0.02623]
°1988 0.00433 -0.00485 -0.00621 -0.00504 -0.03265 -0.02814
[0.00969] [0.00975] [0.00978] [0.02145] [0.02181] [0.02162]
°1989 0.00396 -0.00534 -0.00669 0.01456 -0.01277 -0.00816
[0.01026] [0.01027] [0.01039] [0.01938] [0.01961] [0.01944]
°1990 -0.01331 -0.02268* -0.02403** -0.00584 -0.0333 -0.02857
[0.00923] [0.00926] [0.00924] [0.01706] [0.01721] [0.01719]
°1991 -0.01915 -0.02836** -0.02970** -0.04104* -0.06842** -0.06374**
[0.00988] [0.00992] [0.00988] [0.01625] [0.01651] [0.01640]
°1992 -0.01087 -0.01988* -0.02117* -0.00318 -0.02921 -0.02472
[0.00991] [0.01003] [0.00998] [0.01830] [0.01823] [0.01821]
±1986 -0.02731** -0.02756** -0.02762** -0.11706** -0.11862** -0.11836**
[0.00784] [0.00785] [0.00784] [0.01708] [0.01713] [0.01714]
±1987 -0.02576** -0.02598** -0.02596** -0.04626** -0.04570* -0.04551*
[0.00781] [0.00782] [0.00782] [0.01782] [0.01791] [0.01792]
±1988 -0.01053 -0.01066 -0.01063 -0.04232** -0.04189** -0.04161**
[0.00775] [0.00778] [0.00777] [0.01563] [0.01574] [0.01576]
±1989 0.01111 0.01086 0.01087 0.02215 0.02206 0.02241
[0.00857] [0.00858] [0.00858] [0.01570] [0.01586] [0.01585]
±1990 0.00183 0.00125 0.00116 -0.03330* -0.03592* -0.03533*
[0.00767] [0.00768] [0.00767] [0.01580] [0.01592] [0.01593]
±1991 -0.0063 -0.00715 -0.00728 -0.03270* -0.03607* -0.03530*
[0.00785] [0.00789] [0.00788] [0.01526] [0.01537] [0.01538]
±1992 -0.03586** -0.03683** -0.03700** -0.07963** -0.08373** -0.08303**
[0.00814] [0.00816] [0.00815] [0.01576] [0.01581] [0.01583]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01548** -0.01135**
[0.00195] [0.00345]




Constant 0.13309** 0.07954** 0.06608** 0.46867** 0.17394** 0.20030**
[0.02184] [0.02384] [0.02095] [0.04753] [0.04035] [0.03859]
Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03
F test 4.51 3.7 3.7 5.85 4.88 4.9
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
40Table 5: Employment and Total Sales Growth in Second Episode
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1994 0.01318 0.00361 0.00279 0.05831** 0.04225** 0.04854**
[0.00938] [0.00947] [0.00949] [0.01306] [0.01317] [0.01310]
°1995 0.05350** 0.04366** 0.04306** 0.16040** 0.14334** 0.14986**
[0.00908] [0.00903] [0.00910] [0.01501] [0.01502] [0.01503]
°1996 0.04298** 0.03194** 0.03085** 0.03413** 0.01191 0.02118
[0.00868] [0.00876] [0.00874] [0.01276] [0.01270] [0.01279]
°1997 0.03694** 0.02525** 0.02481** 0.00466 -0.01522 -0.0086
[0.00894] [0.00892] [0.00892] [0.01338] [0.01339] [0.01341]
°1998 0.01244 0.00033 -0.00061 -0.00616 -0.02750** -0.01929
[0.00765] [0.00759] [0.00758] [0.01002] [0.01002] [0.01002]
°1999 -0.00967 -0.02174** -0.02222** -0.03397** -0.05498** -0.04687**
[0.00658] [0.00660] [0.00662] [0.00970] [0.00967] [0.00968]
°2000 0.0038 -0.00794 -0.00863 -0.00518 -0.02905** -0.0174
[0.00629] [0.00623] [0.00622] [0.01129] [0.01056] [0.01123]
°2001 -0.02562** -0.03725** -0.03749** -0.02535** -0.04440** -0.03724**
[0.00627] [0.00628] [0.00628] [0.00976] [0.00974] [0.00973]
±1995 -0.10764** -0.10782** -0.10845** -0.18057** -0.18201** -0.18133**
[0.00807] [0.00811] [0.00813] [0.01160] [0.01161] [0.01162]
±1996 0.01925* 0.02129* 0.02108* 0.00606 0.0085 0.00792
[0.00860] [0.00864] [0.00866] [0.01153] [0.01157] [0.01157]
±1997 0.04741** 0.04889** 0.04924** 0.03450** 0.03671** 0.03563**
[0.00834] [0.00837] [0.00839] [0.01182] [0.01182] [0.01187]
±1998 0.02763** 0.02794** 0.02839** -0.04091** -0.03930** -0.04094**
[0.00758] [0.00760] [0.00763] [0.01075] [0.01076] [0.01078]
±1999 0.00425 0.00379 0.00387 -0.06891** -0.06818** -0.06904**
[0.00790] [0.00793] [0.00795] [0.01073] [0.01074] [0.01075]
±2000 -0.01145 -0.01218 -0.01236 -0.07340** -0.07304** -0.07323**
[0.00743] [0.00745] [0.00747] [0.01026] [0.01025] [0.01027]
±2001 -0.04450** -0.04533** -0.04613** -0.11723** -0.11801** -0.11684**
[0.00772] [0.00774] [0.00776] [0.01055] [0.01052] [0.01056]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01616** -0.00338
[0.00164] [0.00219]




Constant 0.11865** 0.0068 0.0118 0.26587** 0.00191 0.07965**
[0.01504] [0.01784] [0.01435] [0.02607] [0.01890] [0.01828]
Observations 31192 31192 31146 31192 31146 31192
R2 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
F test 22.65 21.73 21.6 19.21 19.25 18.61
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
41Table 6: Investment in Both Episodes
Old Panel, 1984-1992 New Panel, 1993-2001
(Exporters in 1986) (Exporters in 1995)
°1984 -0.02528 °1993 0.04081
[0.03853] [0.05789]
°1985 -0.0268 0.01746 °1994 0.03419 0.18089**
[0.03633] [0.02495] [0.05363] [0.05923]
°1986 -0.01204 0.06360** °1995 0.24938** 0.43419**
[0.03458] [0.02297] [0.05688] [0.06252]
°1987 -0.04138 0.03225 °1996 0.29468** 0.35532**
[0.03595] [0.02078] [0.05321] [0.05655]
°1988 -0.02475 0.04811* °1997 0.21347** 0.23475**
[0.03402] [0.02001] [0.05015] [0.05371]
°1989 -0.03954 0.00572 °1998 0.16472** 0.26502**
[0.03341] [0.01941] [0.04972] [0.05310]
°1990 -0.05014 0.00724 °1999 0.11445* 0.25350**
[0.03302] [0.02189] [0.05035] [0.05430]
°1991 -0.02602 0.06017* °2000 0.02061 0.17828**
[0.03217] [0.02442] [0.05210] [0.05501]
°1992 -0.0108 0.07361 °2001 -0.08713 0.11532
[0.03483] [0.04150] [0.05691] [0.06100]
±1985 0.06032* ±1994 -0.01243
[0.02731] [0.05241]
±1986 0.03113 -0.09647** ±1995 -0.40458** -0.64083**
[0.02734] [0.01841] [0.05322] [0.05844]
±1987 0.00369 -0.13593** ±1996 -0.02897 -0.06124
[0.02744] [0.01760] [0.05269] [0.05623]
±1988 -0.00482 -0.05735** ±1997 0.17897** 0.06983
[0.02803] [0.01640] [0.05053] [0.05415]
±1989 0.07918** 0.04877** ±1998 0.20409** -0.03802
[0.02669] [0.01781] [0.05025] [0.05334]
±1990 0.14020** 0.01951 ±1999 0.02256 -0.21627**
[0.02604] [0.01778] [0.04947] [0.05299]
±1991 0.15869** 0.03055 ±2000 -0.07417 -0.17723**
[0.02599] [0.01933] [0.05130] [0.05443]
±1992 0.21215** -0.05028 ±2001 -0.32602** -0.28135**
[0.02693] [0.02716] [0.05198] [0.05599]
log(capital) 0.88362** 0.90203**
[0.00334] [0.00614]
log(new investment)t¡1 0.96040** 0.66188**
[0.00357] [0.00571]
Constant 0.48368** 0.38154** -1.12555** 2.59656**
[0.05059] [0.05683] [0.09170] [0.09115]
Observations 13156 11682 28757 23026
R2 0.91 0.95 0.59 0.56
F test 2096.88 2685.51 526.84 368.62
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 8: NAFTA and Mexico's Share of U.S. Market
HTS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Change in Mexico's Market Share
Change in tari® -0.135 -0.179 -0.123 -0.105 -0.11 -0.273
[0.047]*** [0.073]** [0.055]** [0.081] [0.089] [0.160]*
(Change in tari®)2 -0.317 0.136 -0.935
[0.400] [0.479] [0.763]
Constant 0.000 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.015 0.014
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Observations 3970 3970 2833 2833 1137 1137
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003
Panel B: Change in log of Mexico's Market Sharez
Change in log tari® y -0.125 -0.11 -0.109
[0.039]*** [0.046]** [0.073]
Constant 0.000 -0.005 0.012
[0.001] [0.001]*** [0.002]***
Observations 3970 2833 1137
R-squared 0.003 0.002 0.002
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
z Calculated from ln(1 + Market Share).
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
Columns (1) and (2) include the full sample available. Columns (3) and (4) include only those goods that
Mexico already exported in 1993.
Columns (5) and (6) include only those goods that Mexico exported in 1994 but not in 1993.
44Table 9: Growth of Mexico's Exports in 1994
HTS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in tari® -21.831 -23.239 -28.365 -26.554
[20.400] [30.347] [7.056]*** [10.498]**
(Change in tari®)2 -11.195 14.39
[178.585] [61.762]
Change in log tari®y -24.181 -30.964
[22.279] [7.707]***
Constant 2.911 2.91 2.907 1.547 1.549 1.545
[0.615]*** [0.616]*** [0.615]*** [0.213]*** [0.213]*** [0.213]***
Observations 2836 2836 2836 2829 2829 2829
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.006
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
Columns (4) to (6) exclude sectors were export growth exceeded 30,000%.
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
Table 10: Growth of Mexico's Exports in 1995
HTS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in tari® 32.445 14.647
[42.197] [14.235]
Lagged change in tari® -48.019 -34.73
[29.491] [9.958]***
Change in log tari®y 39.247 17.278
[49.134] [16.580]
Lagged change in log tari®y -53.275 -37.67
[32.381] [10.936]***
Constant 5.366 3.125 5.363 3.127
[0.940]*** [0.317]*** [0.942]*** [0.318]***
Observations 2899 2888 2899 2888
R2 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
Columns (2) and (4) exclude sectors were export growth exceeded 30,000%.
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
45Table 11: NAFTA and Mexico's Manufactured Goods Share of U.S. Market
NAICS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Change in Mexico's Market Share
Change in tari® -0.195 -0.187 -0.198 -0.194 -0.008 -0.070
[0.095]** [0.205] [0.096]** [0.208] [0.002]** [0.042]
Change in log tari®y
(Change in tari®)2 0.120 0.060 -1.335
[2.637] [2.662] [0.905]
Constant 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 370 370 365 365 5 5
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.809 0.909
Panel B: Change in log of Mexico's Market Share z
Change in log tari®y -0.200 -0.203 -0.008
[0.083]** [0.084]** [0.002]**
Constant 0.003 0.003 0.000
[0.002]** [0.002]** [0.000]
Observations 370 365 5
R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.810
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
z Calculated from ln(1 + Market Share).
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
Columns (1) and (2) include the full sample available. Columns (3) and (4) include only those goods that
Mexico already exported in 1993.
Columns (5) and (6) include only those goods that Mexico exported in 1994 but not in 1993.
46Table 12: Growth of Mexico's Manufactured Goods Exports in 1994
NAICS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3)
Change in tari® -24.050 6.812
[6.685]*** [14.307]
(Change in tari®)2 445.610
[182.975]**
Change in log tari®y -26.237
[7.145]***
Constant 0.442 0.516 0.437
[0.133]*** [0.136]*** [0.133]***
Observations 365 365 365
R-squared 0.034 0.050 0.036
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
Table 13: Growth of Mexico's Manufactured Goods Exports in 1995
NAICS 6-Digit Classi¯cation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in tari® -23.301 -3.169
[60.846] [2.459]
Lagged change in tari® -32.322 -7.031
[48.496] [1.974]***
Change in log tari®y -27.022 -3.442
[65.955] [2.669]
Lagged change in log tari®y -35.944 -7.332
[51.953] [2.118]***
Constant 1.540 1.527 0.268 0.269
[0.964] [0.965] [0.040]*** [0.040]***
Observations 368 368 357 357
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.037 0.035
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
Columns (3) and (4) exclude sectors were export growth exceeded 500%.
y Calculated from ln(1+tari®).
47Table 14: U.S. Imports from Mexico: Tari®s and RER Interaction
Annual Data, 1990-2001
¢ln(Imports)jt
All Sectors Manufacturing All Sectors Manufacturing
¢ln(RER)t¡1 0.232 0.263 0.228 0.259
[0.091]** [0.089]*** [0.091]** [0.089]***
¢¿jt -0.07 -0.075 -0.069 -0.074
[0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]***
¢ln(RER)t¡1 ¤ ¢¿jt -0.273 -0.268 -0.274 -0.27
[0.093]*** [0.086]*** [0.093]*** [0.086]***
Constant 0.098 0.099 0.124 0.122
[0.015]*** [0.014]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]***
Observations 1904 1570 1904 1570
Number of Sectors 164 133 164 133
Sector Fixed E®ects YES YES YES YES
Trend NO NO YES YES
R2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
48Table 15: Entry into Exports and Change in Tari®s
(New Panel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
change in tari® (t-1, t-2) -3.98286 -8.49910* -6.34194 -5.97135
[4.07938] [3.80257] [4.47062] [4.16119]
change in tari® (t-2, t-3) -15.72051** -8.32213* -7.04631 -16.70741**
[4.14535] [3.80915] [4.61739] [4.12087]
change in RER, t-1 0.51979**
[0.12901]
change in RER, t-2 0.24468
[0.14122]
Constant -1.93005** -1.74572** -1.95478** -1.94628**
[0.08385] [0.11048] [0.11475] [0.08546]
Year dummies NO YES YES NO
Industry dummies YES NO YES YES
Observations 4174 4174 4174 4174
Number of ¯rms 658 658 658 658
Standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%.
49Table 16: Mexico's Development Indicators
(Average over three preceding years unless indicated)
1986 1995
Financial Development
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 50.5 41.7
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 13.3 32.9
Liquid liabilities (M3) as % of GDP 29.3 28.9
Listed domestic companies, total 2031 197
Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 7.51 39.7
Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 3.11 15.8
Stocks traded, turnover ratio (%) 51.71 39.4
Infrastructure
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) 52.9 88.2
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 47.8 83.6
Telephone mainlines per employee 100.4 156.0
Roads, total network (km) 2392352 263491
Public Sector and Taxes
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 14.9 13.4
Import duties (% of Imports) 5.8 5.2
Government Consumption/GDP (%) 9.1 10.8
Foreign Indebtedness
External Total Debt/GDP (%) 56.3 32.3
Short-term debt (% of total external debt) 7.8 25.8
Foreign Currency-denominated Long Term Debt (%)3 93.5 78.7
Source: Authors' calculations from World Development Indicators, International Financial Statistics and
Global Development Finance databases.
1 Data for 1998, ¯rst year for which there is data.
2 Data for 1990, ¯rst year for which there is data.
3 Includes all foreign currencies except \multiple".
50Table 17: Transport Costs of Mexican Exports to the U.S.
Average for all Goods














51Table 18: Mexico's Tari®s and Quotas in the 1980's
(t: tari®s, q:quoatas)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
31 Food Products t 42.9 45.4 32.1 22.9 14.8 15.8 16.2
q 100.0 80.1 62.2 33.3 20.8 20.6 16.8
32 Textiles & Apparel t 38.6 43.2 40.4 26.6 16.8 16.6 16.7
q 92.9 66.8 38.0 31.1 2.8 1.1 1.0
33 Wood Products t 47.3 48.5 44.9 29.9 17.7 17.6 17.8
q 100.0 75.6 25.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
34 Paper & Printing t 33.7 36.5 34.8 23.7 7.7 10.1 9.9
q 96.7 54.1 11.2 9.5 3.4 4.1 0.0
35 Chemicals t 29.1 29.9 27.0 20.5 13.4 14.3 14.4
q 85.7 54.0 21.1 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
36 Stone, Clay, Glass t 37.1 38.5 33.8 22.4 13.8 14.3 14.3
q 99.0 53.1 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
37 Basic Metals t 13.6 16.7 18.4 13.8 7.9 11.0 11.0
q 93.3 47.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
38 Metal Products t 43.1 46.3 30.0 20.8 14.1 15.9 16.1
q 90.7 74.8 54.7 51.4 42.7 44.1 44.1
39 Other Industries t 40.9 42.9 40.5 27.5 17.1 18.1 18.4
q 100.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Hanson and Harrison (1995), Table 2.
52References
Aitken, B., A. Harrison, and R. Lipsey (1996): \Wages and Foreign Ownership: A
Comparative Study of Mexico, Venezuela, and the United States," Journal of International
Economics, 40(3-4), 345{371.
Anderson, J., and E. van Wincoop (2004): \Trade Costs," Journal of Economic
Literature, 52(3), 691{751.
Aspe, P. (1993): Economic Transformation the Mexican Way. MIT Press.
Bleakley, H., and K. Cowan (2002): \Corporate Dollar Debt and Devaluations: Much
Ado Nothing?," MIT Department of Economics.
Calvo, G., A. Izquierdo, and E. Talvi (2003): \Sudden Stops, The Real Exchange
Rate, and Fiscal Sustainability: Argentina's Lessons," NBER Working Paper 9828.
Casares, E., and H. Sobarzo (eds.) (2004): Diez a~ nos del TLCAN en M¶ exico:
Una Perspectiva Anal¶ ³tica, Lecturas del Trimestre Econ¶ omico #96. Fondo de Cultura
Econ¶ omica.
Das, S., M. Roberts, and J. Tybout (2007): \Market Entry Costs, Producer Hetero-
geneity and Export Dynamics," Econometrica, 75(3), 837{873.
Easterly, W., N. Fiess, and D. Lederman (2003): \NAFTA and Convergence in North
America: High Expectations, Big Events, Little Time," Economia-Journal of the Latin
American and Caribbean Economic Association, 4(1), 1{40.
Esquivel, G., and J. A. Rodr¶ ³guez-L¶ opez (2003): \Technology, Trade, and Wage
Inequality in Mexico Before and After NAFTA," Journal of Development Economics,
72(2), 543{565.
Gelos, G., and A. Werner (2002): \Financial Liberalization, Credit Constraints, and
Collateral: Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector," Journal of Development
Economics, 67, 1{27.
Hanson, G., and A. Harrison (1995): \Trade, Technology and Wage Inequality," NBER
Working Paper 5110.
Hummels, D. (2007): \Transportation Costs and International Trade in the Second Era of
Globalization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Forthcoming.
Kose, M. A., G. M. Meredith, and C. M. Towe (2004): \How Has NAFTA A®ected
the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence," IMF Working Paper 04/59.
Krueger, A. O. (2000): \NAFTA's E®ects: A Preliminary Assessment," World Economy,
23(6), 761{75.
L¶ opez-C¶ ordova, E. (2003): \NAFTA and Manufacturing Productivity in Mexico,"
Economia-Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association, 4(1), 55{
88.
53Lustig, N. (2002): M¶ exico: Hacia La Reconstrucci¶ on de una Econom¶ ³a. Fondo de Cultura
Econ¶ omica.
Pratap, S., I. Lobato, and A. Somuano (2003): \Debt Composition and Balance Sheet
E®ects of Exchange Rate Volatility in Mexico: a Firm-Level Analysis," Emerging Markets
Review, 4(4), 450{471.
Pratap, S., and C. Urrutia (2004): \Firm Dynamics, Investment, and Debt Portfolio:
Balance Sheet E®ects of the Mexican Crisis of 1994," Journal of Development Economics,
75(2), 535{563.
Romalis, J. (2004): \NAFTA's and CUSFTA's Impact on International Trade," unpub-
lished, GSB University of Chicago.
Tornell, A., F. Westermann, and L. Mart¶ ³nez (2004): \NAFTA and Mexico's Less-
Than-Stellar Performance," NBER Working Paper 10289.
Verhoogen, E. (2003): \Trade, Quality Upgrading and Wage Inequality in the Mexican
Manufacturing Sector: Theory and Evidence from an Exchange-Rate Shock," unpublished,
Department of Economics UC Berkely.
54A Data Appendix
This paper uses data from the Mexican Encuesta Industrial Annual (EIA), the Annual
Industrial Survey. This survey has been widely used in studies on the Mexican manufacturing
sector. We use two versions of the survey; one denoted the \old" version, which was done
yearly from 1984 to 199448, and a new version that runs from 1993 to 200149. We use the
old data for 1984 to 1992 and the new one from 1993 to 2001.
It is important to note that in both cases sample selection is not random, so this
is not a sample representative of all the manufacturing industries in Mexico, but it does
provide reliable information for medium and large ¯rms. Firms with more than one hundred
employees were included with certainty, and then ¯rms were included until 85% of the value
of production at the 6-digit industry level was included. There was not a decisive e®ort to
capture entry.
The basic di®erences in both surveys are in the industry classi¯cation used. For the
old panel the Mexican National Accounts System (SCN) was used, and for the new panel
another taxonomy was applied (the Product and Activities Mexican Classi¯cation, CMAP).
For the ¯rms that appear in both panels there is no problem, we know the correspondence
between SCN and CMAP; for those that are not in both panels, we assigned the value of
CMAP based on the most common correspondence found in the data.50 With the CMAP
classi¯cation, it is possible to use other standard industry and trade classi¯cations, such
as the SITC and HTS, based on existing links between CMAP and the NAICS, the North
American Industry Classi¯cation System.51
We cleaned the data according to several criteria. We dropped observations with
missing key variables (employments, exports, sales, foreign ownership), with suspiciously
large changes in these variables, or those that INEGI said to be \problematic" (which includes
plants whose information all or parts of it, is reported in another plant of the same ¯rm, or
plants that report information of other plants of the same ¯rm). We also decided to work
with the balanced versions of each panel. For the 1984-1994 panel, the raw data has 3,199
¯rms. In this panel some crucial information, namely exports, are only reported for 1986-
1990 and 1992. After cleaning the data we used 1,467 ¯rms. The new panel has a di®erent
number of ¯rms each year, ranging from 6,862 in 1993 to 5,707 in 2001. After cleaning the
data, we worked with 3,899 ¯rms. A total of 999 ¯rms are present in both panels. These are
the complete samples, and in the paper we restricted them according to other criteria, such
as size and export-intensity.
48This data has been used by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996), and Gelos and Werner (2002), among
others
49This data is the one used by Verhoogen (2003) (to whom we are grateful for sharing many crucial insights
as for cleaning the data) and by L¶ opez-C¶ ordova (2003)
50In most of the cases more than 90% of the ¯rms with a given SCN code were assigned to the same
CMAP code.
51Of course, this is not straightforward. There is not a one-to-one match between CMAP and NAICS, and
then between NAICS and other common classi¯cations. We used existing correspondence tables and several
matching algorithms of our own.
55The key variables are straightforward: total employment, total sales, sales to foreign
markets, and spending in new investment. We de°ated all variables with the producer price
index to express them in pesos of June of 2002.
The two-digit industry codes used in Table 18 is the following:
31 Food, Beverages and Tobacco
32 Textiles
33 Wood
34 Paper and Printing
35 Chemicals
36 Non-metallic Minerals
37 Basic Metallic Industries
38 Machinery and Equipment
39 Other Manufacturing
56B Additional Regressions
57Table 1: Employment and Sales During Episode 1
(Allowing for industry-year interactions)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1985 -0.00401 -0.01274 -0.01398 -0.00396 -0.02858 -0.02469
[0.01225] [0.01230] [0.01233] [0.02878] [0.02903] [0.02899]
°1986 0.00969 0.0011 -0.00011 0.09714** 0.07295** 0.07680**
[0.01173] [0.01179] [0.01173] [0.02661] [0.02658] [0.02653]
°1987 0.04700** 0.03846** 0.03716** 0.04191 0.01553 0.01935
[0.01308] [0.01321] [0.01310] [0.02760] [0.02764] [0.02770]
°1988 -0.00262 -0.01168 -0.013 -0.04667* -0.07370** -0.06953**
[0.01070] [0.01076] [0.01079] [0.02262] [0.02295] [0.02279]
°1989 -0.00508 -0.01409 -0.01536 0.00441 -0.02111 -0.01701
[0.01019] [0.01019] [0.01015] [0.02197] [0.02220] [0.02209]
°1990 -0.01403 -0.02286* -0.02410* -0.01154 -0.03654 -0.03252
[0.00988] [0.00990] [0.00989] [0.01923] [0.01942] [0.01942]
°1991 -0.02685* -0.03543** -0.03665** -0.03637* -0.06093** -0.05702**
[0.01085] [0.01090] [0.01087] [0.01764] [0.01785] [0.01778]
°1992 0.00876 0.00058 -0.0006 0.01782 -0.00544 -0.00185
[0.01035] [0.01040] [0.01038] [0.01943] [0.01929] [0.01928]
°1986 0.17683 0.06831 0.06853 -0.35159** -0.34658** -0.33837**
[0.11671] [0.11850] [0.11846] [0.12149] [0.12213] [0.06113]
°1987 -0.0092 -0.11938** -0.11896** -0.00273 0.00903 0.01799
[0.03621] [0.03963] [0.03967] [0.17936] [0.18027] [0.14611]
°1988 0.06302 -0.04664 -0.04622 -0.02679 -0.01701 -0.00783
[0.07087] [0.07307] [0.07315] [0.14195] [0.14365] [0.09708]
°1989 0.11711* 0.00731 0.00767 -0.00326 0.0048 0.01415
[0.04804] [0.05103] [0.05110] [0.12778] [0.12904] [0.07372]
°1990 0.03332 -0.07759* -0.07737* -0.14198 -0.13724 -0.12719
[0.03201] [0.03570] [0.03571] [0.13076] [0.13241] [0.07948]
±1991 0.07292* -0.0382 -0.03797 0.17565 0.18134 0.19134
[0.03431] [0.03798] [0.03803] [0.17795] [0.18121] [0.14672]
±1992 0.11162** 0.01025
[0.04041] [0.13195]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01478** -0.01057**
[0.00193] [0.00340]




Constant 0.04777 0.10537** 0.09257** 0.45708** 0.17067 0.18483**
[0.02743] [0.03425] [0.03189] [0.12403] [0.12159] [0.05820]
Observations 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736 11736
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.09 0.09
F test 2.77 2.9 2.84 4.99 10.77 5.9
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
Coe±cients for the interaction of industry and year not shown.
58Table 2: Employment and Sales During Episode 2
(Allowing for industry-year interactions)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1994 0.01935 0.00985 0.00942 0.05445** 0.03951** 0.04523**
[0.01028] [0.01037] [0.01040] [0.01390] [0.01398] [0.01393]
°1995 0.05700** 0.04712** 0.04671** 0.15942** 0.14319** 0.14949**
[0.01000] [0.00998] [0.01004] [0.01495] [0.01493] [0.01494]
°1996 0.02565** 0.01445 0.013 0.01521 -0.00539 0.00301
[0.00921] [0.00927] [0.00925] [0.01337] [0.01339] [0.01340]
°1997 0.03060** 0.01905* 0.01872* -0.01529 -0.03350* -0.02761
[0.00938] [0.00933] [0.00932] [0.01448] [0.01445] [0.01454]
°1998 0.00575 -0.00606 -0.0066 -0.00749 -0.02725* -0.0195
[0.00794] [0.00788] [0.00787] [0.01066] [0.01065] [0.01066]
°1999 -0.00188 -0.01357 -0.01376 -0.02561** -0.04519** -0.03747**
[0.00712] [0.00715] [0.00717] [0.00989] [0.00985] [0.00986]
°2000 0.00676 -0.00478 -0.00518 0.00097 -0.02284* -0.01044
[0.00664] [0.00657] [0.00655] [0.01200] [0.01097] [0.01196]
°2001 -0.01918** -0.03070** -0.03057** -0.00507 -0.02371* -0.01632
[0.00681] [0.00682] [0.00683] [0.01045] [0.01044] [0.01041]
±1995 -0.09432* -0.11551** -0.02882 -0.02485 -0.07951 -0.11711
[0.04633] [0.04436] [0.03849] [0.06056] [0.05738] [0.06951]
±1996 0 -0.01952 0.06729 0.09036 0.03876 0
[0.00000] [0.04597] [0.04033] [0.05964] [0.05642] [0.00000]
±1997 -0.01436 -0.03428 0.05261 0.0754 0.02388 -0.01501
[0.04347] [0.04110] [0.03463] [0.04142] [0.03595] [0.05328]
±1998 -0.01624 -0.03653 0.05017 0.00936 -0.04295 -0.08136
[0.03975] [0.03691] [0.02964] [0.04249] [0.03771] [0.05442]
±1999 0.02051 0 0.08632* 0 -0.05188 -0.08986
[0.04559] [0.00000] [0.03809] [0.00000] [0.04396] [0.05910]
±2000 0.00719 -0.01388 0.07222 0.07851 0.02827 -0.01004
[0.05169] [0.05014] [0.04488] [0.05050] [0.04626] [0.06069]
±2001 -0.02846 -0.04991 0.03601 0.06546 0.01448 -0.02302
[0.04009] [0.03808] [0.03096] [0.04412] [0.04047] [0.05612]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01536** -0.00252
[0.00163] [0.00216]




Constant 0.13053** 0.0389 -0.0392 0.14863** -0.04551 0.06757
[0.03491] [0.03446] [0.02338] [0.04002] [0.03125] [0.05017]
Observations 31192 31192 31146 31192 31146 31192
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
F test 6.65 6.67 6.67 8.8 9.01 8.88
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
Coe±cients for the interaction of industry and year not shown.
59Table 3: Investment with Industry and Year E®ects
(Allowing for industry-year interactions)
Old Panel, 1984-1992 New Panel, 1993-2001
(Exporters selected in 1986) (Exporters selected in 1995)
°1984 -0.05047 °1993 0.07817
[0.04222] [0.06193]
°1985 -0.04525 0.0116 °1994 0.13056* 0.23774**
[0.04027] [0.02736] [0.05748] [0.06448]
°1986 -0.01411 0.08326** °1995 0.25738** 0.39859**
[0.03808] [0.02565] [0.05990] [0.06655]
°1987 -0.0442 0.03502 °1996 0.19605** 0.25558**
[0.03990] [0.02278] [0.05729] [0.06049]
°1988 -0.03063 0.05033* °1997 0.19182** 0.26451**
[0.03777] [0.02259] [0.05374] [0.05682]
°1989 -0.04139 0.00484 °1998 0.12752* 0.24276**
[0.03769] [0.02262] [0.05302] [0.05710]
°1990 -0.03279 0.0198 °1999 0.09604 0.26545**
[0.03709] [0.02397] [0.05459] [0.05888]
°1991 -0.00763 0.06628* °2000 0.03944 0.20821**
[0.03654] [0.02748] [0.05699] [0.05960]
°1992 0.00615 0.02911 °2001 -0.06833 0.13005*
[0.03860] [0.04460] [0.06052] [0.06564]
±1986 0.07015 ±1994 -0.032
[0.15022] [0.23961]
±1987 0.0586 -0.03339 ±1995 -0.82460** -0.56320*
[0.15607] [0.16855] [0.25548] [0.28199]
±1987 0.00906 -0.37741** ±1996 -0.28975 0.18558
[0.15469] [0.14418] [0.26431] [0.25640]
±1988 0.00633 -0.14016 ±1997 -0.46869 -0.07025
[0.15843] [0.08499] [0.26969] [0.30939]
±1989 0.06043 -0.00638 ±1998 -0.23199 0.3202
[0.15350] [0.06800] [0.23137] [0.26291]
±1990 0.03543 -0.08363 ±1999 -0.35655 0.02853
[0.16458] [0.08172] [0.23213] [0.26843]
±1991 -0.01882 -0.07987 ±2000 -0.43751 -0.00498
[0.16639] [0.13599] [0.22813] [0.27847]
±1992 0.19763 -0.16047 ±2001 -0.40146 0.17888
[0.15330] [0.25492] [0.25181] [0.28947]
log(capital) 0.88386** log(capital) 0.90461**
[0.00337] [0.00613]
log(new investment)t¡1 0.96138** log(new investment)t¡1 0.66457**
[0.00354] [0.00573]
Constant 0.51064** 0.45326** Constant -0.85845** 2.39994**
[0.12042] [0.06479] [0.16976] [0.19599]
Observations 13156 11682 28757 23026
R-squared 0.91 0.95 0.6 0.57
F test 1206.24 1181.14 94.08 71.51
Prob > F 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
Coe±cients for the interaction of industry and year not shown.
60Table 4: Employment and Sales During Episode 1
(Excluding High-Export and Small Firms)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
°1985 0.0026 0.00272 -0.00224 0.01413 0.01378 0.0079
[0.01125] [0.01125] [0.01147] [0.02639] [0.02639] [0.02701]
°1986 0.01362 0.01051 0.01099 0.05954* 0.06124* 0.05096*
[0.01213] [0.01164] [0.01237] [0.02420] [0.02514] [0.02464]
°1987 0.03540** 0.03764** 0.03600** 0.04177 0.04598 0.04005
[0.01207] [0.01245] [0.01220] [0.02608] [0.02679] [0.02629]
°1988 0.00433 0.00192 0.00197 -0.00504 -0.002 -0.01139
[0.00969] [0.00980] [0.00991] [0.02145] [0.02175] [0.02159]
°1989 0.00396 -0.00308 0.00453 0.01456 0.01334 0.00732
[0.01026] [0.00965] [0.01031] [0.01938] [0.01977] [0.01939]
°1990 -0.01331 -0.01435 -0.01435 -0.00584 -0.0085 0.00094
[0.00923] [0.00930] [0.00942] [0.01706] [0.01631] [0.01705]
°1991 -0.01915 -0.01903 -0.0161 -0.04104* -0.04140* -0.04288**
[0.00988] [0.00990] [0.00993] [0.01625] [0.01627] [0.01635]
°1992 -0.01087 -0.00797 -0.01172 -0.00318 -0.00052 0.00366
[0.00991] [0.01003] [0.00977] [0.01830] [0.01852] [0.01842]
±1986 -0.02731** -0.02789** -0.03178** -0.11706** -0.11720** -0.12266**
[0.00784] [0.00783] [0.00856] [0.01708] [0.01710] [0.01821]
±1987 -0.02576** -0.02568** -0.03108** -0.04626** -0.04499* -0.04772*
[0.00781] [0.00782] [0.00852] [0.01782] [0.01784] [0.01932]
±1988 -0.01053 -0.00988 -0.01511 -0.04232** -0.04191** -0.04932**
[0.00775] [0.00777] [0.00841] [0.01563] [0.01565] [0.01659]
±1989 0.01111 0.01171 0.0031 0.02215 0.02228 0.01447
[0.00857] [0.00859] [0.00833] [0.01570] [0.01573] [0.01656]
±1990 0.00183 0.00125 -0.00277 -0.03330* -0.03340* -0.04866**
[0.00767] [0.00768] [0.00817] [0.01580] [0.01582] [0.01666]
±1991 -0.0063 -0.00631 -0.0148 -0.03270* -0.03272* -0.03865*
[0.00785] [0.00785] [0.00829] [0.01526] [0.01526] [0.01621]
±1992 -0.03586** -0.03609** -0.04537** -0.07963** -0.07910** -0.09435**
[0.00814] [0.00816] [0.00879] [0.01576] [0.01578] [0.01664]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01548** -0.01527** -0.01953**
[0.00195] [0.00197] [0.00226]
log(total sales)t¡1 -0.02996** -0.02985** -0.03131**
[0.00281] [0.00283] [0.00312]
Constant 0.13309** 0.13383** 0.16512** 0.46867** 0.46819** 0.49755**
[0.02184] [0.02212] [0.02657] [0.04753] [0.04813] [0.05211]
Observations 11736 11588 10680 11736 11588 10680
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
F test 4.51 4.35 4.92 5.85 5.75 5.63
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
Coe±cients for the interaction of industry and year not shown.
Note: Columns (2) and (4) are from table 4; columns (3) and (6) exclude from the sample
the small ¯rms, those with less than forty workers in every year.
61Table 5: Employment and Sales During Episode 2
(Excluding High-Export and Small Firms, Exporters selected in 1995)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
°1994 0.01318 0.00635 0.00761 0.05831** 0.04774** 0.05660**
[0.00938] [0.00921] [0.01006] [0.01306] [0.01299] [0.01354]
°1995 0.05350** 0.04818** 0.05351** 0.16040** 0.12147** 0.14444**
[0.00908] [0.00937] [0.00965] [0.01501] [0.01469] [0.01518]
°1996 0.04298** 0.03735** 0.03924** 0.03413** 0.02942* 0.02281
[0.00868] [0.00859] [0.00923] [0.01276] [0.01257] [0.01323]
°1997 0.03694** 0.03204** 0.03693** 0.00466 0.0037 0.00425
[0.00894] [0.00880] [0.00955] [0.01338] [0.01339] [0.01395]
°1998 0.01244 0.0069 0.00895 -0.00616 -0.01127 -0.01008
[0.00765] [0.00737] [0.00807] [0.01002] [0.01013] [0.01046]
°1999 -0.00967 -0.01229 -0.01182 -0.03397** -0.03289** -0.03559**
[0.00658] [0.00666] [0.00710] [0.00970] [0.00982] [0.01024]
°2000 0.0038 0.00678 0.00313 -0.00518 -0.00121 -0.00252
[0.00629] [0.00646] [0.00652] [0.01129] [0.01122] [0.01180]
°2001 -0.02562** -0.02190** -0.02443** -0.02535** -0.02478* -0.03517**
[0.00627] [0.00627] [0.00666] [0.00976] [0.00993] [0.01005]
±1995 -0.10764** -0.10723** -0.11393** -0.18057** -0.17942** -0.16755**
[0.00807] [0.00808] [0.00904] [0.01160] [0.01160] [0.01255]
±1996 0.01925* 0.01951* 0.02105* 0.00606 0.00571 0.0161
[0.00860] [0.00861] [0.00951] [0.01153] [0.01155] [0.01231]
±1997 0.04741** 0.04564** 0.04339** 0.03450** 0.03333** 0.03339**
[0.00834] [0.00832] [0.00935] [0.01182] [0.01183] [0.01271]
±1998 0.02763** 0.02786** 0.02577** -0.04091** -0.04096** -0.04031**
[0.00758] [0.00759] [0.00843] [0.01075] [0.01074] [0.01156]
±1999 0.00425 0.00445 0.00166 -0.06891** -0.06910** -0.06697**
[0.00790] [0.00792] [0.00880] [0.01073] [0.01075] [0.01156]
±2000 -0.01145 -0.01137 -0.01694* -0.07340** -0.07432** -0.07677**
[0.00743] [0.00744] [0.00821] [0.01026] [0.01024] [0.01095]
±2001 -0.04450** -0.04450** -0.05047** -0.11723** -0.11677** -0.11281**
[0.00772] [0.00773] [0.00847] [0.01055] [0.01057] [0.01136]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01616** -0.01605** -0.02883**
[0.00164] [0.00167] [0.00215]
log(total sales)t¡1 -0.01765** -0.01730** -0.02250**
[0.00183] [0.00188] [0.00209]
Constant 0.11865** 0.11857** 0.20012** 0.26587** 0.26271** 0.33000**
[0.01504] [0.01519] [0.01777] [0.02607] [0.02655] [0.02869]
Observations 31192 29996 27440 31192 29996 27440
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
F test 22.65 22 22.21 19.21 18.09 17.82
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
Coe±cients for the interaction of industry and year not shown.
Note: Columns (2) and (4) are from table 5; columns (3) and (6) exclude from the sample
the small ¯rms, those with less than forty workers in every year.
62Table 6: Employment and Sales During Episode 1
(Including only ¯rms present in the Long Panel)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1985 0.01118 0.0026 0.00103 0.00398 -0.0202 -0.0149
[0.01231] [0.01227] [0.01226] [0.02884] [0.02927] [0.02917]
°1986 0.00076 -0.00793 -0.00949 0.04085 0.01652 0.02195
[0.01389] [0.01397] [0.01394] [0.02498] [0.02514] [0.02500]
°1987 0.02791* 0.01923 0.01763 0.05302 0.0277 0.03313
[0.01370] [0.01390] [0.01374] [0.03039] [0.03043] [0.03057]
°1988 0.00591 -0.00311 -0.00475 0.00962 -0.01696 -0.01127
[0.01088] [0.01094] [0.01101] [0.02643] [0.02691] [0.02665]
°1989 0.00048 -0.00868 -0.01032 0.00778 -0.01886 -0.01304
[0.01192] [0.01195] [0.01192] [0.02258] [0.02282] [0.02258]
°1990 -0.01752 -0.02671* -0.02833** -0.00719 -0.03384 -0.02797
[0.01061] [0.01056] [0.01060] [0.01850] [0.01873] [0.01864]
°1991 -0.02818* -0.03722** -0.03882** -0.04833** -0.07491** -0.06910**
[0.01188] [0.01193] [0.01190] [0.01813] [0.01849] [0.01834]
°1992 -0.02262 -0.03134* -0.03290** 0.00027 -0.02478 -0.01926
[0.01212] [0.01228] [0.01225] [0.02220] [0.02211] [0.02209]
±1986 -0.02355* -0.02385* -0.02388* -0.11942** -0.12108** -0.12078**
[0.00947] [0.00947] [0.00946] [0.01889] [0.01892] [0.01894]
±1987 -0.02123* -0.02153* -0.02150* -0.03834 -0.03814 -0.03786
[0.00935] [0.00937] [0.00937] [0.02006] [0.02018] [0.02018]
±1988 -0.00807 -0.00837 -0.00832 -0.03685* -0.03713* -0.03676*
[0.00875] [0.00878] [0.00877] [0.01738] [0.01757] [0.01757]
±1989 0.02110* 0.02063* 0.02065* 0.03133 0.0302 0.03071
[0.00884] [0.00883] [0.00882] [0.01745] [0.01767] [0.01764]
±1990 0.00793 0.00695 0.00687 -0.03353 -0.03751* -0.03659*
[0.00904] [0.00906] [0.00904] [0.01802] [0.01821] [0.01820]
±1991 0.00106 -0.00028 -0.00039 -0.02074 -0.02555 -0.02435
[0.00887] [0.00890] [0.00887] [0.01753] [0.01771] [0.01771]
±1992 -0.02344* -0.02504** -0.02524** -0.07675** -0.08276** -0.08146**
[0.00964] [0.00965] [0.00963] [0.01763] [0.01771] [0.01773]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01439** -0.01131**
[0.00228] [0.00405]




Constant 0.12548** 0.07297** 0.05838* 0.46450** 0.16793** 0.20163**
[0.02493] [0.02706] [0.02367] [0.05505] [0.04535] [0.04330]
Observations 7992 7992 7992 7992 7992 7992
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
F test 3.74 3.27 3.29 4.66 3.91 3.91
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
63Table 7: Employment and Sales During Episode 2
(Including only ¯rms present in the Long Panel)
(Exporter Selected in 1995)
Dep Var: % Change in Employment Dep Var: % Change in Total Sales
°1994 0.00034 -0.0074 -0.00925 0.06370** 0.04659* 0.05346*
[0.01176] [0.01185] [0.01189] [0.02161] [0.02200] [0.02159]
°1995 0.04794** 0.04014** 0.03862* 0.10391** 0.08670** 0.09307**
[0.01517] [0.01520] [0.01518] [0.02604] [0.02599] [0.02602]
°1996 0.03883* 0.0304 0.02859 0.00612 -0.01213 -0.00604
[0.01663] [0.01696] [0.01715] [0.02228] [0.02247] [0.02231]
°1997 0.03681* 0.02783 0.02606 0.02757 0.00892 0.01528
[0.01579] [0.01567] [0.01551] [0.02295] [0.02307] [0.02285]
°1998 -0.00121 -0.01053 -0.01273 0.00706 -0.01254 -0.00558
[0.01096] [0.01102] [0.01103] [0.01787] [0.01797] [0.01785]
°1999 -0.03869** -0.04794** -0.04973** -0.04863** -0.06852** -0.06125**
[0.01338] [0.01355] [0.01377] [0.01682] [0.01701] [0.01698]
°2000 -0.01395 -0.02280* -0.02438* 0.00704 -0.012 -0.00505
[0.01003] [0.00995] [0.01004] [0.01642] [0.01646] [0.01652]
°2001 -0.03903** -0.04775** -0.04931** -0.03907* -0.05499** -0.05122**
[0.01104] [0.01107] [0.01109] [0.01796] [0.01779] [0.01799]
±1995 -0.06157** -0.06123** -0.06181** -0.10580** -0.10701** -0.10582**
[0.01123] [0.01126] [0.01129] [0.02169] [0.02170] [0.02170]
±1996 0.05673** 0.05832** 0.05799** 0.06590** 0.06623** 0.06752**
[0.01521] [0.01535] [0.01544] [0.02080] [0.02084] [0.02084]
±1997 0.06383** 0.06524** 0.06534** 0.03149 0.03355 0.03242
[0.01130] [0.01130] [0.01133] [0.01986] [0.01990] [0.01992]
±1998 0.06033** 0.06135** 0.06210** -0.01841 -0.01697 -0.01788
[0.01039] [0.01039] [0.01040] [0.01784] [0.01784] [0.01786]
±1999 0.04892** 0.04953** 0.04963** -0.02333 -0.02224 -0.02284
[0.01277] [0.01281] [0.01283] [0.01914] [0.01917] [0.01918]
±2000 0.03018** 0.03062** 0.03032** -0.04540* -0.04492* -0.04479*
[0.01092] [0.01089] [0.01089] [0.01882] [0.01880] [0.01882]
±2001 0.00148 0.0019 0.00143 -0.07943** -0.08264** -0.07850**
[0.01056] [0.01056] [0.01059] [0.01821] [0.01785] [0.01819]
log(¯rm size)t¡1 -0.01128** 0.0014
[0.00317] [0.00351]




Constant 0.02658 -0.03189 -0.04025* 0.11995** -0.04909 -0.00136
[0.02022] [0.02601] [0.02050] [0.04545] [0.03698] [0.03705]
Observations 7992 7992 7980 7992 7980 7992
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
F test 8.5 8.24 8.24 6.02 5.94 5.87
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in brackets.
signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
Coe±cients for 4-digit industry dummies and for the interactions of FDI and year, not shown.
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